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ABSTRACT 
How do small states survive as independent political 
entities in the jungle of international politics? What are 
the conditions or strategies for survival? These are some 
of the issues examined in this paper with particular 
reference to the experience of Singapore. 
Singapore has survived since 9 August 1965 as an 
independent political entity in a region not unaccustomed to 
the political demise of.small states or armed conflicts 
since the Second World War. Cambodia, East Timor, 
Indonesian 'Confrontation', the French and Americdll military 
involvements in Indochina, the Sino-Vietnamese war, Tllal-
Laos border armed conflicts, and most recently the Spratley~ 
armed conflict between China and Vietnam, are s~11ent 
examples. The region is also replete with irredentisl 
violence of varying degree~. 
Singapore's strategy for survival rests largely on the 
combination of intrinsic strength (a credible self-defence 
capability) and a strategy to harness as much 'derivative 
strength' (regionalism, alliance, diplomacy, et cetera) a~ 
possible. As will be argued, a small state can never hope 
to defend itself against a bigger power on its own and would 
need to derive additional st:r'ength for its military dnd 
( iii ) 
deterrent posture through various devices like an astute 
foreign policy, regionalism, and the manipulation of extra-
regional interests. 
The strategy for survival for a small state however is 
not without its costs. Small states with their innate 
deficiencies in material and manpower resources have to bear 
a disproportionately higher cost for their security. Also, 
they have very little influence over international or 
regional developments and are usually left to react to 
changes in their strateqic environment. Such is the case of 
Singapore. 
INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS OF SMALL STATE SECURITY 
Small states1 in general face greater and more acute 
challcIlges to their security than larger states.2 Security 
is a multi-dimensional concept, broadly encompassing 
mIlitary , political and economic elements. In its military 
sense , secu r ity is the ability to deter or repel armed 
attack. In its political sense, security is orderly 
effective government free from intimidation, subversion, or 
political violence . In its economic sense, security is 
material sufficiency, fair distribution, and the prospect of 
adapting to changing conditions in an orderly manner.3 What 
concerns us here is basically the military security of small 
states. 
In an international system char:acter Ised by t:.e ab~,ence 
of any central authority, th~ larger powers with greater 
materidl dnd human resources have a distinct ddvantage ove 
the small(=r unes. For a small state like Singapore, the 
1. See Michael Handel, Weak states In the International 
System, London: Frank Cass, 1981, pp.3-65 and David Vital, 
The Survival of Small states, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1971, pp.1-12 for a good discussion of some of the 
difficulties in the classification of small states. 
2. A possiblp counter-argument to that aSHRriion is perhSk}6 
that the superpowe~s, given the possibility of mutudl 
nuclear annihilation, have a much more acute security 
dilemma than the small state. 
3. Steve Hoadley, Security CooperatIon in the South 
Pacific, Peace Research Centre Working Paper No.4l, p.l. It 
must be rloted that these 'different' elements of security 
are not distinct quantities but are mutually reinforcing 
variables. For example eCOIlomic insecurity can exacerbate 
or lead to political instability and vice versa. 
1 
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vital question is therefore one of survival. As Brigadier-
General (Reservist) Lee Hsien Loong puts it, "How do \Veak 
states survive, as integral political entities in a hostile 
and inhospitable world? That is the question."4 
The business of survival for small states is an 
extremely onerous one. The price which small states have to 
pay for survival is disproportionately high, given the 
innate deficiencies in material and human resources. 
Survival may be wrought by military and diplomatic 
strategies. The practical problems and constraints 
Singapore faces in ensuring its survival as an 'integral 
political entity' forms the subject of this paper. Using 
Singapore as a case study, this paper analyses some of the 
difficulties small states face in their quest for survivdl. 
What are the constraints on dt:fence faced by small 
states in general? The constraints on defence for d small 
state stem primarily from any or all of the following three 
fundamental disadvantages, namely, small territorial size 
small population and limited resources. These cant; tra i nts 
have important strategic implications. 
4. BG Lee Hsien Loong in a speech at the SingdpoLe 
Institute of International Affairs on 16 October 1984. 
Straits Times, 6 Nov 1984, p.20. 
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Firstly, small territorial size means the absence of 
strategic depth in the defence of a small state. 
puts it: 
states controlling only a small space 
are more vulnerable to attack, 
especially surprise attack. Having no 
strategic depth, strategic withdrawal is 
out of the question; they have little or 
no room to maneuver and face the danger 
of being quickly overrun; they are 
unable to "trade space for time" in 
order to reorganise their defenses and 
continue to fight. The loss of the 
first battle can mean the loss of the 
whole war .... Defense in depth is not a 
viable strategy.5 
As Handel 
Secondly, a small population would necessarily mean d 
smaller military force. Soldiers lost in battle also cannot 
be readily replaced. 7he cost of fielding all able-bodied 
ltizens and the best minds for the defence of the country 
is a dete.rioration or decline of the country's econ(lmy. In 
the case of a 'citizen army' like Singapore's, a prolonged 
all-out conflict may even destroy the economy.6 Hen~e, ~np 
strategic inlperative is for a small state to fight a uui~k 
and decisive war, if deterrence and diplomacy fdil. 
Thirdlv, the constraint of limited resou:r-ce:::.: is 
axiomatic. I t I i In its the n urn b e r 0 £ c hoi C P. S oye n t () t h ._ 
5. Handel, op. cit., pp.70-7.1, quoting Pandyotis ?iplnel i.-> 
"Integration; Detente, and the Smdll CountriE'h'" in Nat.o 
Letter, 15 (November lQ66), p.lO. 
6. The then Defence Minister of Singapore, Dr Goh Keng Swee 
remarked that mobilising of Singdporc's r~serve hrig3des 
into action Vlould "tear the (Juts out of the ci.viJ.ian 
economy." See Straits Times, 7 Aug 1971. 
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leaders of small states in all matters of the state. In 
terms of defence, it precludes high self-sufficiency in 
weapons and ammunition production; hence a high dependence 
on foreign sources of supply. This dependency renders a 
small state vulnerable to external coercion and blackmail in 
times of conflict. Moreover trade routes may be disrupted 
or blockaded by the hostile power(s) in times of conflict, 
preventing much needed military supplies from reaching the 
small state. 
In sum, the constraints imposed on the defence of a 
. 
small state means that it has a much narrower margin of 
error, both in peacetime and in war. Any strategic mistake 
can be fatal. As David Vital puts it 
.... where the consequences of error. are 
catastrophic and the margin of error is 
extremely small, political and 
intellectual talents of a very high 
order are needed if catastrophe is to be 
avoidetl .... The faillIlt;Js and errors uf 
Lhe leaders of great powers can be 
disguised and compensated for by the 
,_,rgani::,atiorldl dnd materidl reSOlt£Ces 
they can briny to bedr .... But the errore 
of the leaders of minor powers have 
immediate and unmistakable consequenceb 
and are only too often beyond repair; 
and there is no disGuising them.7 
Fortunately for smdll states , the ~Lrategic 
deficiencies engendered by their natural endowm~nts (or th 
lack of them) mrly be mitigated hy certain measur·t:;~->. m 
7 . . ~ 1 . t V 1 I~ a lOP. c 1 • . ... 2 . 
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lack of strategic depth for example means that the small 
state must never be caught by a strategic surprise. This 
requires comprehensive and effective intelligence of 
potential threat(s) and an ever ready armed force. Constant 
vigilance is vital. Its military forces should also be 
highly mobile and be capable of being mobilized and deployed 
in the shortest time possible. For a small state with "no 
space to trade for time", time is very crucial and may 
partially compensate for the lack of space. Its strategy 
must therefore stress rapid deployment of forces to prevent 
the enemy forces from achieving even a toe-hold on its 
territory. And if the enemy forces do achieve such a 
lodgement, a highly mobile force would allow the small state 
to open another front at the rear of the invading forces. 
The quantitative deficiency of the armed force~ may 0e 
mitigated by universal conscription and gtlalltatlv 
enhancement of the available forces. Universdl conscription 
is one way of tdppinq all dvailable human reSOl.1rcE.:S for Lh~' 
defence of a small stdte. Smdll states like Switzerldnu, 
Sweden, Singapo.re, et cetera all have conscroiption ar:mies. 
Effective and comprehensive training of available military 
pe:t'sonnel would also improve what Klaus Knorr callH "trle 
military worth" of the armed forces, 
11, 
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Military worth means expected overall 
military effectivenes~, and this value 
depends on many qualitative 
factors .... obvious that most qualitative 
factors are unconnected with size of 
country .... 8 
Acquisition of technology-intensive as opposed to manpower-
intensive military hardwares would also reduce the manpower 
demands on the small state's military while improving the 
military worth of the forces.9 
All these measures are of course contingent on the 
availability of resources. The constraints of limited 
resources may either be mitigated by external aid and/or 
more effective utilization and allocation of the country's 
available resources. What is reuuired .is dsluLe pldnn.in<j. 
For examp1e the high dependence on f.!xter.nal 111ilitar 
supplies may be dlleviated by the creation of locdl drms 
industries with a view for the export markets so as to rPdI: 
the benefits of the economies of scale. Sweder Sw.i t.zE~rldnc1 
and Singapore are again good cases in point. Such local 
arms industries will ensure that in times of conf:iC"t, the 
small state would have at least a limited independent 
capaci ty to replace weapons and dmmuni tions lost in combdt . 
Moreover. every small state's defence problems must be 
considered wilhin its strateg.ic milieu. It is well nigh 
8. "Klaus Knor.t: Constraints on the Defense of a Smal1 
Country" in The Defense of Small 
Center For Strategic Studies PdP 
Aviv UniversIty, pp.2-3. 
9. Ibid .. p.7. 
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impossible to generalize with sufficient accuracy on the 
problems of small state defence other than on some very 
broad principles like those discussed above. Every small 
state's unique strategic milieu would confer additional 
advantages or disadvantages to its military defence. Handel 
refers to a weak state's "external or derived" st:rengthlO 
while Vital proposes that "the capacity of the minor power 
to sustain conflict with a great power depends ... on 
contingent factors and on contingent advantages and 
capabilities .... "11 
The constraints placed on a small state's defence 
however. mean that in military terms, small states in 
general are defenceless against a determined milIt.drv 
onslaught a bigger Dowe:r. It is imrJortant tu ILole t hdt 
such a deLermined military effort may rdnge from an {Jutrigtl l 
conventional attack to low-level military harastJment,=, 
without dny formdl cJec:la.r"aLion of war. Hence, it is obvioll 
thdt d small state cannot hope to survive for long i e ~ 
bdS8S its security .Jolely on militdry deft:->ncc. '1 r ! i t,(,u: Y 
defence has a vital role to pldv in the (i'n'"(dll ndliondl 
s~curltv strategy for a small state. .A ere d i b 1 e <1f_' f t' nee 
£ 0 r c e ens u res t h d t the .s m d I 1 g tat e 1 sea p a h 1 e 0 Edt: 1 f> ,"i' I-
.inflicting considerable degrpp of damage on any potentjal 
predatol.. rrhat wou' no l1.y C'omplleatp t.he . k calc:ulu .. 
of an ntending predator but. would also pn::-.ure ~.h,=it the 
10. Hande1 
-\ 1. Vita 1, 
op. cit 
op. c':'~., 
pp.68-70. 
[.>.9 
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predator does not easily accomplish a military fait accompli 
before the possible intervention of powers friendly to the 
small state under threat. 
A small state must therefore also rely on an arsenal of 
derivative strengths to ensure its security. Thes._ 
derivative strengths may range from alliance with an 
external big power (Israel and the United states o~ 
America), to a policy of strict armed neutrality (as in 
Switzerland) . There is a wide and varied range of 
political, economic and diplomatic measures which a small 
state may adont to ensure its sec-nriL. -, ') How drl<1 wl \. 
measures a particular small stdte may Jdopt w~ll dp.n(~nd 
lartjely on its strategic position or environment. 
'T' h e s e me d sur e s hen" e v€' r 11 5 U a 1 1. Y c; a .r .r \ ·th thf'lIl hiqh 
101itical, economic and/or mi)ltary cOf3ts.13 Cuba'~ 
alliance vlith the Soviet Union in t.he 19605 miqht have 
ensured its security vis-a-vis the United Statps; bu it is 
also arguable that i+ ad put Cuba under gtpclte l~ 
U.S. militar n.c:tiOTlo:>. -::;'O! exa@ole, hdd the U.S. 
Cuba during th Cuban Missi.les C yo i ~~ ~ -.=: • ........ a- .J..;_ _ .. 1962, C"UUd.'::; 
a i. 1 ian c e 'vi i t h the S (I vie tUn 1 0 n \oJ 0 U 1 d h a v e b r. (j l~ <J } 1 lit 
(1 i S d S t e r ~ eve n i f the S 0 vie tUn ion we ret 0 ret a :. ~ . ate a 9 din s t 
be U.S. ~ t r i k 1 n q i:l t T u r k ('~' , Th ddnye of 
12. Sue h me d S U 1 e::5 a s t a ken by Sin 9 a [lOr e w i 1 2. bet. h f' i (l C U ~ 
our discussion in Chapter Four. 
3. See Ddvid Vital, The Ineaualitv of states. Oxford. 
Clarendon Press, 1967 
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alliance partners becoming proxies or pawns in big powers' 
rivalries is very real. The point is that every policy 
choice entails a certain cost to the small state; be it 
political, economic and/or military. 
Singapore's strategy for survival is largely predicated 
on two synergistic components: a credible defence force and 
a foreign policy tuned to the nuances of the game of balance 
of power. As argued eaIlier, small states can only manage a 
relatively inferior military force, and more than any othel 
powers, they have to rely heavily on derivative 0 
contingent political and diplomdtic factors ~s well 
Chapter Two will examine SingdLH)YP'S stratef.Tic 
environment with regard to the management of Sin 
security. Chapter Three will th(,.~n dit5custi t.hp nrob1.t ' r.l:= of 
defence faced by Singapore. Finally, Chdpter Four will 
examine the derivative fdctor 
security. 
importan, ) Sin rJ a pur (' f 
CHAPTER TWO SINGAPORE'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
A stark feature of Singapore's strategic environment is 
its geographical minuteness in relation to its immediate 
neighbours. Singapore ' s population size is also dwarfed by 
that of Malaysia and Indonesia. ThIs great geographical dnd 
demographic disparity is rendered even more conspicuous by 
the contrasting ethnic composition of Singapore's population 
with that of its immediate neighbours. Table 1 below 
highlights the differences between Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia in terms of geographical and population sizes· 
while Table 2 shows the ethnic compositions of the 
resoective populationo. 
able 1 ReldLive Ter.L itorldl - Population Sizes 
L·rr·~n~l·al n 1"7e .~ , ~-~~~ '. ~ ~ P "1.1--. 0pU.l.aL.lOn 
'Singapore 61 0 C( ) 0 .... :. dli .... 690.000 
IMdldysia 329,758 sq km 16,920,000 
I 
I 
I Indonesia .. 919, 
I 
y 
3 so km 170.7.00,000 
Mdldysid an 
'~90. 
10 
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Table 2 Relative Ethnic Composition of Populations 
Chinese Malay others 
ISingapore 
I 
75.9<30 15.2% 8.9% 
IMalaysia 
! 
31.8% 57.7% 10 . 5«?b 
IIndonesia 3.0% 96.0% 1.0% 
I 
Source: Country Profile 1989-90 Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990. 
Singapore's relative economic affluence also marks it 
out from the region (see Table 3 below). Singapore's per 
capita income is four times that of Malaysia and twp}ve 
times that of Indonesia. And as an island ·-nat ion that 
services the export and import dct-ivities of the 
neighbouring countries, Sing.3pore i~ the fucal point of 
regional commerce. These factors have combined to project 
Singapore as the "odd boy" of the neighbonrhood. 
Table 3: Relative Economic Figures in US Dollars 
GNP Per Cap i La I llCUffi 
ISingapore 
I 
17.97bn 6.431 
IMalaysid 26.34bn 1,636 
I 
I 
I I ndones ia 
I 
86.47bn 530 
Source: Asia Yearbook 1988, Far Eastern Ecc)nomic Review. 
Compounding the factors of scale, thn i city drH1 
economic development, are the legacies of recent history. 
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Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965 climaxed 
a period of volatile ethnicity-centred politics while part 
of the Federation from September 1963 to August 1965. 
Separation was in essence the product of an irreconcilable 
contest between two visions for an independent Malaysia, 
namely, the United Malay National Organisation's (UMNO) 
vision of a Malay-dominated political system based on the 
concept of the "bargain" and the People's Actj on Party's 
(PAP) vision of a "Malaysian Malaysia".1 
The PAP's campaign for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' 
threatened the political dominance of the Malays who 
regarded themselves as bumiputras ('belonging to the soil') 
and hence the rightful sole proprietor to the country. This 
a g s e r t jon 0 f Ma 1 a y pol i tic a 1 do min a nee w.~ 5 f 11 e 11 e d by t h €:' 
Chinese dominance of commerce and wealth in the countr)-. 
Reta i n i ng po 1 it ica 1 domi nance WdS ~eprt by UMNO as neceb~ld 
to the eventual re-c1istr ibution of economic we.·lIth in Lh 
country - hence the subseC1uent introdur.tion of the New 
Economic Policy under the- UHNO-led government. Th issue 
wh:ch broke the federation WdS the ethnic hostilitjes 
bet W p f::' nth e Ma 1 a y san d C h 1. neg est i r red u p by the d if f C! .r. en t 
1. See Diane K Mauzy (ed.) Politics In the 
KUdla Lumpur: Maricans , ULdated, pp.151-160 
analysis of the tumulluous politics of thdL period. The 
concept of the 'bargain' postuldtes thclt political power i 
Mdlaysia should reside with the bumiputrd Malay rdce in 
return £Ol: the grantinq of Mc1:'aY::'i.:~n citizenBhip to the non-
Ma lays. The' Ma lays ian Malays ia' ar<Jume n t howeve r con tE'nc.I~' 
that all Malaysians are equal and that MalRysia sh0uld not 
be 0 r 9 ani sed en the ba s 1 S 0 f ct n y ~> t rue t. u r a 1 rae i d 
discrir:inatlon. 
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political parties" The then Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman decided that in order to avert a major racial 
flare-up, Singapore had to leave the federation. 
However if Singapore's separation from Malaysia was 
meant as a desire on the part of the Malaysian Prime 
Minister to excise what he perceived to be a cancerous 
growth on the Malaysian body politic, it was perceived by 
the Singaporean leaders as a direct threat to the survival 
of Singapore. As Michael Leifer puts it, separation "was 
not an expression of separatism but of rejection .... survival 
became the watchword of state anu 0 '()j.1C II') 
Singapore'!:.\ secur i ty vIas a Iso -> r 1 1 ere 0 n t e ;.;~ :. f) , '1 , "1'" 
t l-u""' n I n don e s i a r e ~, ide 11 t S 0 e k a r no' sad ve n t uri ~' t. i (' C ci m ,I:-> a i 9 n 
of konfronlasl . , , or! 1 ca .... ... y, rp '.-) 111'" ,/ 
Maldysicl .. Hid the Bornp,o tf'rr. i tor ie~ of Sdtklh dnd [)drd\v(-1k. 
Tha konfrontasi pisode revedled to the SinyctpOred. , ..a..~~ 
the danger of S1.ngapore t s securi.tv beinq s h 
policies of a revolutionary regim~ in th u ~. 
countries. ndeed when prompted S i rHJ d L> 0 red n 1 e d J E' r.:..; h 
alluded to such a tear f ir.rati0nal eatJ 
owe in thp neighbouring ("ol1ntrit's.3 n 
Lee Hsien Loon ... , " .. Singdpore cdnnol i lUng i 1 
2 . tv1 i c: h del Lei fer, tI The Con <1 < .. l ,... ~ 
Sandhu, K and Wheatley, :Paul ( 
Singap()le: ISEAS, 1989, p.968 
.... (, ra' "if.,," m;mes '4 J'l '988 ,j. ~ \..".~::) .lL ,I.. \.y ~ 
(> 
. ) 
"I 
Fo,:p'ign 
Ma ~I" 
.... le f BG 
• .j. o l.l 1 ' 
Po 1 i ['yll 
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be like to have an obscurantist irrational government in 
charge of the far shores of the Straits of Johor."4 
Singapore's immediate security concerns are therefore 
tied to the policies and actions of Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Hpnce it is imperative to examine Singapore's relations with 
Malaysia and Indonesia in the context of Singapore ' s 
perception of its security concerns. 
Singapore-Malaysia 
Singapore and Malaysia have been described as 
constituting a " single strategic entity" .5 Accordin9 to the 
Chief of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), Lt-Gen Winston 
Choo, II or, les~on of the Malavan Campa 1, gn ; I'I W" ... ' "1 W -~ l. _ 0,,- ...... .;;1. ... r T 
~hat still hold~ C) t h y 0 l- } .. , ~ . .-
Malavsid an S i ngalJor no le fact thclt the tr~p;-:; dre 
now two sovere ign n:rt ions d()I..~~~ no ~ \"'dl ... " .,., 
indivis-:'bil~" ot the en C' p 0 j t h p (-;(:~ t w () {' 0 I. H. ~ r i e f be i n g 
" ani n p s c: u P d b 1 e con~:; e que fI Cp.o :f lY·""" f.. 
of this indivisibility in the are ot air defL'nC'f' 
.... .--d undp th I n t. e <l r d. t f~ 
4 1988 D.2 
... 
[", . 
21 Jul 
been r i 'b:!r<J ted u~n 
Gon .,.. e""" H'· ," ".' ~ ~ ~J L ~,~ead~r~) 
(" \r," f f 
"-'.' leo Forces (SAF) 
Choo. strajts Times, Lj !'1aI :98 
Arrnpd Forces Chief, Generdl Tan Sri HashIm 
dlso alluded to this indivisibility of the 
woe 0 un t r : e s w hen he.) po k e a + 
September 1988,_ Straits Tim 
6. Ibid. 
via. 
~1 
.t.. ..J, 
A"" 'Tlp 
lay B 
1 " , 
Lt-r; 
The 
defe 
L\ 1~ 
~" 
p.1. 
s 
("'inQ(~p 
l1e oJ. 1 
of tllf 
:. u 1; i r, 
Chapter Two: PIS 
(lADS) which operates under the umbrella of the Five-Power 
Defence Arrangements (FPDA). 
Tentative steps have also been taken with regard to 
bilateral joint exercises irvolving ground troops. In May 
1989, a first-ever one week joint land exercise between the 
armed forces of Singapore and Malaysia codenamed Semangat 
Bersatu or Unity in Spirit, was held at the Singapore Armed 
Forces Training Institute (SAFTI).8 It was hdiled dS a 
milestone in the defence relations between the two countries 
as the previous land exercise involving troops from the two 
countries were conducted under the auspices of the FPDA and 
only once, in 1970 (Exercise Bezsatu Padu), as it conducted 
in We::-;t Ha sia.9 In October 198 the armip of 
aldvsia } a secund joint exercis in Sarawdk. I 
.;.~ppear I.. !1d t. the ('. l-) • J. 1 --. ~ , dn~' 
an ann 1lal b~sis.l() 
Singapore--Halay!:]idn !.eldLion.:.. t..P 
characterised bv the 
resentments which th 
Singauor became in 
("cording to P l' 
nphasis on ra , 
government took the on 
q 
9 • 
10. ') 
ba<]CJd _ "!~P 
Jest. for Mal h ~(-~ " c\ _-< l;t 
, it fdshionpd 
But ~ v 1 ,i ••• :.t 
rae' it ( F!. t.::, 
y :989 . 1 . 
.. dY :989 ., 
, .' 
.()(,It'' 
'L' 
.j. )..,L"> 
... 
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constitutional and political basis for the continued 
dominance of the Malays over other groups in society. 
Singapore's economic progress also out-stripped that of 
Malaysia over the years. WhaL emerged today are two 
extremely close geographical neighbours who share a common 
history and common social and cultural links, but with 
almost contrasting worldviews and values. For Singapore, 
its economic progress and extensive links with the West have 
resulted in an outlook that is basicall 'North' in nature; 
whereas in Malaysia, its high dependence on the export of 
certain basic commodities and the extractive nature of its 
economy align it with the aspirations of the 'South'. 
Singapore is also decidedly pro-Western in its international 
or' i en tat ion s.. but Ma 1 a YE~ i a s t i "!.. 1 h d n k aEtpv- l} )~ 
a Third World advocate. The close ph I, h j .:-HH 
culLural bonds which could have n dt;5ctS to 1'1 
{1 eve lop men t 0 f goo d n e i 9 h b 0 urI y reI a t. i 0 11 S, w hen j u x t (1 ~l 0 S e ( ~ 
wit h the con L r as tin g W 0 rId vie W$ d n d v d 1 ~l 
at Dolitical and emotional contentlons. 
I 5 l. ami t> d 1 SOd P () t e ~'l t i alL.. 0 U r (" p () y 
, Cdn 
n 
(. 
1 . L' , i. LCdL 
conflict between Malaysia and SinqdDore. Islam Is clof,el 
ied to thE} culturp t.radit.ionsl and COmml..Hldl 1 ~ 
the Malays in bot.h Malaysia and SlnqafJor As the 
Singdpore const.itute only a m~nority of abo~_<t :5.2~~ L ttlP. 
ODU':"dtion, Islam has never been a cruc'ial lSS .> f n( 
politiC's in Singapore. dldvsid howpv "lE'r i. L 1 ('d ' 
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power reposed in the majority Malay race (57.7%). the 
politicisation of Islam is perhaps inevitable especially 
when different Malay-based political parties compete for the 
votes of the Malay electorate. The politicisation of Islam 
in Malaysia can quite easily spill-over into the Malaysia-
Singapore relationship. For example , Israel's President 
Herzog visit to Singaporell developed into a major political 
issue between Malaysia and Singapore precisely because anti-
zionism had become an issue of Malaysian politics. For a 
Malay pol it ic ian in Ma lays ia I the fa i lure to pr otest aga i ns l -
the Herzog visit to Singapore would undermine his or hpr OWl 
olltiral standing among thp Malay (-'lecloratf~. Al In 
ime, these Mala\ oliticians, consciouh of th impact \vhic:. 
staternentb er itic:al of Singapore Cdn llRve 0 the MuldY 
electorate of ten resorted to' Singapore --bash i ng' t n a(JVarH'p 
the' pol i tic a 1 for t. u n e~.., . The Herzog visit and th 
in-the-SAF Gontroversy12 \vere heavdll-sent opportunities for 
these Malay politicidns in Malaysia. The pol i t i (".) 1 r u rl 1H.~ d 
11. The Israeli Head of state Chaim Herzog vif:,itE'u SinCJdpOrt 
fro m 18 - 2 0 Nove m b e r 1 9 8 6 . T ha t u £ £ .:. c Lot 1 vis i t d r (I tU; e ( 
adverse and at times hostile rPdctions from variou.,j 
po 1 i tic a I, reI i <] i 0 us d n d s () cia 1 9 r 0 U P j rigs i n MAl d Y f) ~ a . 
Charges that Si.ngaporf\ hdd become a "ba~)tion fu 
S () :,l the a s t As i a" and t h r Pdt B l CJ cut CJ f f Sir I CJ (i P () .r c ,~; W d l c r 
supplies from Jollor were heard dur in<,J the din. 
12. This controversy dr();.je dS d result of BG Lf'P H~-;:.en 
L 0 0 n g 's 5 tat em en t , in res po n~; e to a g u est ion d uri tl CJ t3 ':,H~ {! t 
the peoplp I se ')sion, that Malny c,f) 1(~ierf; in thp SAF dtt' no 
allocated ce.r·tain spnsiLivl' pObitioTIS b(i(<.Iu~,;C' ,'W(> liv 
S 0 11 t 11 e d s t A~; 5. a . . . . 1ft h P. rei s oJ con f 1 i c: t d n c1 the S i 11 CJ rl. P (i .i.. ,_ 
Arm e d F () r c e f) .i 5 r all e d up () n t () ct p fen (1 t. h e h u Ir e ~ d r 1 .. ~ I we (~'~. ! , 
wanl: to put dny of our solr1iprs in d djff~cult posItJon 
where hIs emotions .for the ndtion indY COIPf' into corl£lic-' 
with hi~ emotions for his religIon ... " Thd.t £,tatemell 
furthpi ~,;ou!f>d d already strdir.ec.1 relt3tio:1~,hip [o11{)win'J 
., . -'t C' th 0.1- '.I-. m' '1r ~A "1087 .., I1erzog VISI. ,:.'lee p ul..rall.S Imes, .... :J nar 17 I' II.l. 
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created by the Herzog affair and the controversy regarding 
the question of Malays in the SAF reveals the sensitive 
nature of the political relationship between Singapore and 
Malaysia. 
Another factor which contributes to the difficu1. 
Singapore-Malaysia relationship is the fact that not all 
Malaysians are convinced that the build-up of the Singapore 
Armed Forces is not directed ~pecifically at Malaysia. The 
popular ' Johor scenario' postulates the invasion and 
occupation of Southern Johor by Singaporean forces in the 
event of an armed conflict between the two countries. Hence 
the argument goes, Singapore maintains a highly mobllp f( 
<...~tru("'tur"e e B pe c ir .. i 1 :. y i t 350 AMX-13 light ldOks dnd l('clrl~ 
1 . 0 0 0 arm 0 Ll r P. dDt? r 5 ann c 1 car r 1 e r S d S W c' 11 a ~"; the 
concentration on high -povlered 15Smm cJrt i ller\. Th.Jt 
Halavsid should perceive such a security threat the 
build-up of the SAF is unnpt"standrlLl(' Oll 
Given Sinsapore's minute siz Imost total lCif.'l.ce 
.vternal tr"clde and ~-, oj: o ()(1 d wdtpr 
mainly from Johor), the ... thing "which. 
1 ed.(1 {":l. \\IOU' w ~~ <:1 \ifa A:..~ BG L'"' ! r :: .~E::n ~ • l i 
.July 1988 vet~re the Harvard BusJnp.:.: , c ... n 
Mdldv::.;id in Kuala Lum~)ur 
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Suppose ... by an accidental turn of 
event~, Singapore found herself in 
charge of the southern parts of West 
Maldysia. How could 2.6 million 
Sirlgaporeans occupy a vast territory 
many times the size of Singapore? How 
could we control the large, diverse and 
spread out population, several times 
larger than Singapore's? How would we 
handle sensitive and delicate religious 
and communal issues, in which we have no 
experience whatsoever, without violent 
reactions? Immediately Singapore would 
discover that she had simply added to 
her problems, both internally and 
"nternationally, and would wish a return 
to status guo ante. So any Singapore 
government would be crazy to try it.13 
Hence. a more accurate and realistic characterisation 
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the two countr ies met in Vancouver proved to be a tryinc-
time for Singapore-MalaYsian relations. In October 1937 
Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Mahathir Mohamad met irl 
Vancouver following the Commonwealth Heads of states Meeting 
to discuss bilateral relations. Dr Mahathir told the 
Sin gap 0 reP rim e M i. n i s t e r t hat ! f w h i 1 e hew ant s bet t e r 
relations with Singapore, he hopes the climate for thes. 
relations would not become inhc3p:.table because the two 
countries run one-man-one-vote system. !! l Dr Mahathjr ther 
said that Singapore should approach its '-1 If ' _au ems In a more 
circumspect or wider perspective , taking the feelings of 
fv1aldysian Halays into consideration. " jr Lpf> Kuan Ypw 
11.1.. () oJ r~o 1""\ Stilc.16 
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objective is not to checkmate the other player. but to win 
as many tricks together as possible.nl8 That realiscttion 
WdS followed by a series of initiatives to enhance the leve: 
of cooperation between the two countries. These included 
the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale 
of Water and Gas to Singapore, the first ever State visit to 
Singapore by the Malaysian King since Separatioll. and the 
identification of various areas of economic and militar' 
cooperation. 
I" The younger generation of Singaporean leaders led by 
Goh Chok Tong and BG Lee Hsien Loong seem to have come to 
the view that Singapore's security and continued prosperi~y 
are closely tied to the security and econorrdc vle J 1-be i n<J o.c 
"1 3YS ia and Indone::.;ia. It . in Sin c..r aDo r E-> ' .. 5 
web of interdepen(lellt economic, r.) 0 1 ~ ~ 1 (. ("\ i ~ tit 
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main factor being that Indonesia does r~ot consider Singapore 
as a threat now or in the future.20 iven its vast 
geog r aphy and huge po pulation, Indonesia can take a more 
detached attitude towards Singapore ' s military build-up. 
I ndeed, Soenarso Djajusman opined that " one day. when 
Malaysia ' s population became big enough , · it would have the 
same attitude as Indonesia's in this matter and would no 
longer regard Singapo:re as a th:reat."21 
From Singapcre ' s perspectivE , whatever legacy may 
rema i n from the konfrontasi episode is the reminder that the 
political stability and character of the ruling regimes i .. 
the neighbouring countries can have an important bearing all 
the ~.ecurity of Singapore. The lesson beir.-J - .... -.... . -". --, - . ~ 
mu~t never tdKP lts security and [>pace for g:r'~ ~ ( . 0 • : I "",l ..... _ 
d:'vldV5 p:repdre it.:') defence so as to CODe w]. t 11 thp wor 
t>cenario of havinq revolutiona1.Y (be it reI iglou~. 0 ... 
a t ion.1 1 i ~;. t j c:) r P <J i in e z rig h tal i. l s dOd r: s 1 P P rn\ S ()(' !td ( 
.1.eadershi in ndones ia wi tl its PlUlIha}"} is n n.3t:o - ", ."1 ... 
economic Clnd social development 1 much lrlfic'( 
and t r us tin Sin 9 d J) 0 ret t) W dr" its ~ a r 9 t~ f; t r . 
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source of concern for Singapore, especially if the Dolitical 
heat generated by the competition for the Presidential 
office results in a throw-back to the nationalistic era of 
Soekarno. 
For the present however, Singapore-Indonesian relations 
have gradually expanded over the years and have blossomed in 
the last year or two. This positive trend may be attributed 
to the "per sonal chemistry" between Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew and President Soeharto of Indonesia as well as pragmatic 
calculation of mutual benefits if areas of cooperation are 
expanded and enhanced. As Ambassador Soenarso Djajusman 
opined, Indonesia needed to be friendly with SingaDorA for 
pracct iCc'll ed~on:.} SOE>Cid' -. r he pu r ;;>0~~~' .j: 
In the i e 1 d 0 f sec uri t y C () 0 P E-' r ':-i t ion b e t \1 e f' 1 
arl(! Indone:-:,ia, the most rf~c.:ent dnd po~itivE' cXi.)rt'[;sl 
being the joint development an("l. ooerat.ion of thp Siabu Ai .. 
Weapons Range nedr PeKdn BdY.U 1 n Sumclrtd dnd the 9 of 
the Army l1emoralldum of Understdnding a::o)"ing the SA""" 
"dlmost. unlimited access" to train on Indonpsia 
In return Singanore will allow I ne": I) 1'1 I:! Sid dCCeSf:-, 
mi:ilarv techncJ logy in for eXambJ 1 e; the t f"' f.,Jt u., ) () ~ 
• , +- 2~ S 1 m 11 .1. d I.. 0 r::->. 'f Ot~ley j 0 i nt f'ffortf) m.:tV i riC 1 uJe 
ma.Intenance and se:rvicinq of L i 1 f' F 1 (,l - .L .,.~ ('1 nl. 
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the SkvhdWkQ. which are common to the Air Forces of the two 
countries.2S According to an experienced observer of the 
Indonesian scene Yang Razali Kassim, for "the budgct-
starved Indonesian Armed Forces, co-operation with Singapore 
is a cheaper way to develop some of their own facilities and 
spread the costs of maintaining military hardware."26 
For Singapore such extensive cooperation would serve 
to increase the stake which Indonesia (and for th3t mdtLer 
Malaysia), has on the well-being of Singapore. By tieing 
the interests of Indonesia dnd Malaysia together with those 
of Singapore, Singapore has in a way increased the 
probability of Indonesia and/or Malaysia corning to its 
assistance n the event of a military t.hr'(-'dt f 
i.""'0wer (most 1. n L he £ 0 r m 0 f 1 (j 'vi - 1 eve:: b d r ct • 
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strategic Significance of Singapore 
Singapore's location at the crossroads of maritime and 
air traffic between the Indian and Pacific Oceans endows it 
with a degree of strategic significance insofar as the major 
powers with interests in such maritime and air traffic are 
concerned. The observation made by Yuan-Ii Wu in 1972 
remains valid: 
To a Pacific-oriented natio~, Singapore 
is the gateway to the Indian Ocean and 
Western Europe. To an Indian Ocean-
oriented or European nation , Singapore 
is the gateway to the 
Pacific .... Therefore, all great powers 
and maritime trading nations that value 
unimpeded passage between the two oceans 
have an interest in the maintenance of 
this condition, although the degree of 
this inte .rest var ies from country to 
untry.27 
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minimum interests of the major powers are est accommodated 
if Singapore's political and economic status quo l~ 
maintained. 
Insofar as Singapore's strategic perceptions are 
concerned, they appear to be: 
a) As an extremely small state , Singapore fdces a 
theoretical military threat from Indonesia and/or MalaYsia -
the threat being measured in terms of objective military 
capabilities and the capacity to sustain armed conflicts' 
b) Any invasive threat from a power oth_ tl1an 
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Hence there is a perceptible hierarchy of potential 
threats facing Singapore.29 That hierarchy of potential 
threats is clearly coterminous with the proximity of the 
states to Singapore. In this regard, the first circle of 
potential threats has to be from Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The second circle of potential threats would involve the 
powers capable of launching a landward invasion via 
Peninsula Maldysia, viz., hina India, VietnanL Burma and 
Thailand. The next rung of potential threats would be from 
the superpowers and regional powers with a highly developed 
maritime capability. 
For Singapore therefore its military defence efforts 
have o serve two broad strategic functions, i.e. be 
sufficient in deterring an armed conflict with Malaysia 
and/or Indonesia; and. be able to work in concert with tnp 
~orces of ~~lclYSl 
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makes great strategic sense; but that haR to be supplemented 
by increasing its arsenal of derivative strengths as well. 
These derivative strengths include ensuring a favourable 
regional balance of power and increasing the stake regiona' 
countries (especially Malaysia and Indonesia) may have on 
the continued well-being of Singapore. 
The Singapore government is aware that Singapore needs 
to "make provision against the possibility of only a 
middling, not a big, power attack " .31 As Dr Goh Keng Swee 
stated in Parliament in December 1968, 
.8 nee 
... if a really major ~~reat develops 
sayan invasion by 50 jivisions or d 
Lhreat to deliver a nuclear attack, then 
a situation arises which concerns not 
only ourselves but all the major world 
_)ower..:-. A:l d3~klult bv ~)O divl.3~vns or c 
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CHAPTER THREE : A MILITARY DETERRENT CAPABILITY 
Sin gap 0 rea t t a i ned its i n de pen den ceo n 9 A IJ gus t 1 9 6 5 .:\ ~) 
d consequence of its separation from the Federation of 
Malaysia. s e pa r ation meant that Singapore now had to take 
care of its own defence . The continued presence of the 
British military bases in Singapore provided a temporary 
security umbrella while the infant state took steps to build 
an independent defence capabilit7 ' The British however gave 
notice to the Singaporean leaders that the days of its 
mil i ta ry presence in Singapore were numbered. As a result, 
the quest for a military deterrent capability gdthe'red pace 
and urgency. 
• . . b 
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of t wo old ships , the RSS Panglima and the RSS Singapur~ and 
there was no Air Force to speak of. 
From such a small motley of personnel, equipment dnd 
military expertIse, the Singc::~ore Armed Forces (SAF) was to 
be created. At the beginning , the emphasis was on creating 
in the shortest possible time a semblance of an independent 
defence force. Such a force was deemed necessary for 
Singa~ore in order " to deter other nations from attacking 
it z to help maintain internal security, to assist in the 
development of national self-confidence , and to purchase its 
place in any future regional military alliance".3 Above 
all , it was Lee Kuan Yew's conviction that 
You Cdn have the best. of politicd 
climates, but if the power to sustaiI1 
your position is not tl1ere, then yot: 
must lose. In tht~ last resurt it is the 
power which c1pcides wbal hdppens, und 
therefore, it behoves us to ensure thdt. 
we dlwdYS haVf! ()verwilelmintT Dower on 0:. 
side.4 
A credihle deterrent caoability is thus deemed d~ 
for safequarding Singapore's s~curity and prosperity. 
idl 
p()SSf:~5sion of such a C'dpability provides d balla at. anI} 
or ~ingdPore's foreign polie but cll::.o for S inqaDOrC', 
. n -building and economic deveIoDment. 
3. Dick Wilson, op. cit., p.61. 
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Once the decision was made to proceed with the bllilding 
up of the SAF , the difficult tasks of planning and 
im p le menting the plans had to be faced. In this regard 
Singapore ' s defence build-up has been conditioned bv a 
number of constraints. Some of these constraints are 
similar to those attendant to small state def(~n["e5 while 
others are peculiar to Singapore. 
Deciding on the Type of Armed Forc es 
The first issue to be resolved was what type of armed 
forces should Singapore develop. At least four options were 
considered , namely , 
a) a small, highly-trained regular army· 
)) a Idrge reguldI army; 
<- ) d SID gn Llr tlpnlempnt 
._ e ~:": f' r v I~;; a ! H 
d) c1 Sil1rJ 11 reg\; 1 o 
reserve.6 
'I'll 
..... mdiO ra 
-4 h 
then wa~ tJ £ ina r~ cia: a n (. ! e C () n 0 :ill c of mal 
effective ar.mf:'c aLee >mdl,l.. hi(jh' , J 
rm findnci~:ly f trdtegically lack:nl 
cJU of' 
the <Juestion dn 
Chaoter 
6 . 
A larg 
~O the exorbitant 
o~. elL. 
E 
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g 
P 
~ I"l 
• .L 
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financially and in terms of the opportunity costs to the 
civilian economy. A small regular corps supplemented by a 
volunteer reserve appears viable but a volunteer force 
inevitably lacks the type of professional expertise requjred 
for a modern armed forces. 
The choice of a small regular corps supplemented by a 
conscript reserve was eventually 3doDted. Moreover 
conscription or ' National Service ' was also viewed right 
from the beginning as a vehicle for nation-building and for 
the inculcation of values deemed essential for the progress 
of Singapore I name ly "val ues 1 ike disc ipl i ne loyalt 
leadership and other useful qualities " .7 As a SAF 
publication puts it 
in 
.•. an army bd:.:.;ed on d model of d regul~ 
orps supplemented by d conser' 
reserve would not erlC'roach excessivel}' 
un the findncial ~nd manpower nel~ds or 
the nati.on dS a whole, while meeting the 
numerical requirements dS rapidly a~ 
~) 0 ~) sib 1 e . . . . I twa S d 1 :> () hop e c1 t h t..i t l his 
model would serve as a v(~hicle to 
develop patriotism dnrJ help CL0dte 
national icientity through the 
de vel () pille n t () f a III U 1 t i - r: d c 1. a I arm y VI 1 t r. 
no c;ommuna 1 lOYr.ll t'le.:? but rather onf~ 
commitment Lo th~ defence uf t 
nation.8 
'rile then Furelgn Minister S. R d j a I cl "t n a m I 11 
1967 remarkeJ that lh ove:rnment's goal v/dS "to mdKe 
ve citizen a solclie-" He al~;o sdid that unL1" th 
7 • D 1: Go h Ken 9 S wee I 5 bud get ~; p pee r - - - __ - - - - - • ___ • 0 • , D(~ C' 
1963 . 0.1. 
- - - - " ' ,- .. ,. - - _. - on _ ~- _ o. -.. .. I Git. p.lS. (\ 
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National Service scheme , " the " tragedy" that had befallen 
many ne wl y -independent countries - militar y dictatorship 
could be avoided " . Said Rajara t nam , 
Where defence is put solely in the hands 
of a professiona l arm}, the army sooner 
or later becomes a law unto itself. I t 
becomes a ruling caste. But where , as 
under our scheme , the able-bodied 
civilians are also trained soldiers , a 
militar y takeover becomes pretty 
remote .9 
In Search of Foreign Expertise and Assistance 
In its search for foreign assistance , Singapore was 
" somewhat forced " to choose the Israeli advisers " because 
several countries side-stepped (Singapore ' s) dpproaches for 
assistance. tl 10 According to S ingaoore ' s current Ambassador 
to the United Nat i ons , Professor Chan Heng Chee , "assistance 
was d i :3 G Y' e (> t 1, o:>ought frofn n()n-~l ianec:lAb 1..:311 ann Af:r ied. 
CO U n t r ' i (.) 5 but t h ~ res p () n sew a ~ poor a 5 rna n y 0 f t 11 P. m h d d 
reservations about assisting an urlknown Rtate in the 
sensitive ared of defence. Even t u~d l,Y, th nt... of 
I f) rae 1 1: e S D () n de d .J. n c1 t h (~ fir 5 tIs r del i In i ~. s i 0 ,( J dt 
thE of 1965. " 11 Thf' Isrclcl: adv· r e in l. 
9 . '='t .... ~t5 Times, 2 Sep 1967, p. 4 • Orl 29 August 197") 
Rajaratndm ngdin alludpd to Lhp point ~l' - t. I.. Id ,j :!..dr 
with it " the threat n£ an drm 
9 Aug 1972, D.9. 
1974. D. 11 . 
11. C han He n 9 C h e (! I " Sin g a 11 0 r () n i n Z a k d r .i a H a j i nc1 
Harold Crouch (eds . ) , Hilitary-Civilian ,,--~ .. -.- .. -. ------
~ - - -
Singauore: 
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on a strictly advisory capacity and they numbered some 
forty-five at the height of their presence in 1969.12 
The need to seek foreign help in building up 
Singapore's defence force reveals a weakness faced by small 
states in their quest for military security as this 
dependence on foreign assistance has its political costs. 
Singapore had to seek assistance from other non-aligned 
states because as a newly independent state "fresh from the 
yoke of colonialism " , Singapore's international credibility 
and political standing would be adversely affected if it 
were to bask under the friendly tutelage of a Western power. 
Indeed Indonesia insisted that the continued presence of the 
British military bases jn Sing.71DOTe m~de !.t ,') 11t~O-
colonidllst outDost. President SoeKarno'3 aggressive 
·1"-1- , . +7 k 'f m 1. 1 \" a r y po _ 1 C yo.... . 0 n r·_ .. - -- ~ ~. n the cdrly 1960( \.1,-3 f 
proclaimed as preventiri<J the consol~datlon of the neu-
colon i ali s ted i fie e () f Fed f~ rat ion bet WE' to! n :3 i n gaD 0 r: e 
Peninsula Malaya and the Br i tish Borneo terr j tor If~~1. 
-. 2. The nee d 11 vis f:! r ~; VI a ~j t 1 r . 
April 1974. See the 
. ,. tT"be .L • deli~ 
h ,e dn 
of the Singa 
I ~) r del iDe fen c e For c e [j who s e f d S tan d com p r f' S ~:; edt r d I Tl i n <J 
!":) Y s t em a 1 5 0 met the nee (h') 0 f S 1 n 9 ,"-i po ret 11 e n 1. n c.r eat i n 
d e t 0 r r en t for c e r. a p i u 1 Y . The 1 s r del i d c1 vis e r: ~) tH.~ 11) f' d set n 
the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute an(1 were .~"\ 
involved in thE: development of cdch drrr. of the drmed fore 
as well as certain specialist functions like loyistic~ 
ining, generdl staff J.nd the settinq un of the Armed 
Forces Technical Institute. 
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More importantly, Singapore's acceptance of the Israeli 
assistance continues to colour the perception of Singapore 
by its immediate Muslim neighbours, particularly Malaysia. 
The Israeli connection has the unfortunate effect of making 
Malaysia and Indonesia project their perception of Israel 
onto Singapore. Hence the popular, though inaccurate13, 
analogy of Singapore as aspiring to be an "Israel of South-
East Asia". 
That Singapore recognizes the political and diplomatic 
side-effects of its security association with Israel is 
underlined by its continued support for the United Nations 
Resolutions 242 and 338 regarding the Palestinian question 
dnd the public downplaying of that Israeli connection. As 
recently as February 1990, Lee Kuan Yew alluded to the more 
appropriate Swiss model of defence for Singapore as compared 
to the Israeli's. 
Perhaps it is t~ue that Singapore was "somewhat forced" 
to accept the choice of Israeli advisers. Given the dire 
security situation in which Singapore found itself after 
separation, the imperative to create a credible defence 
capability overshadowed whatever political costs were 
entailed. Twenty-five years hence, Singapore possesses a 
13. The most obvious difference between Singapore and Israel 
is that while Israel's existence has, till recently,been 
disputed by the Arab states, Singapore's existence is 
accepted internationally and regionally, Singapore is an 
active member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). 
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professional military establishment unrivalled in the region 
in terms of professionalism, technical expertise and 
equipment. Perhaps the time has arrived to mitigate the 
political " unwisdom " 14 of invoking the Israeli assistance in 
the building up of the SAF. 
Military-Civil Society Relati ons 
The acceptance of the role of the armed forces by the 
society at large is vital to the functioning of a citizen-
army. As such the relationship between the military and 
society has to be symbiotic and well-nurtured. With barely 
twenty-five years of independence, Singapore faces 
difficulties in nurturing that symbiosis. 
One major problem which Singapore faced in the edrly 
yea r S 0 £ its d e fen c.: e b u i 1 d - up VI a ::.. the a b sell Leo f ,:-{ s t L 01. 
military trddition. Though milita.ry voluntari 
drt of Sjngapore's pre-independent histor b~g.i rin 
the Eorm<Jtion of the Sin(japc c L''''" 
in 1854, the acceptdnce bv the dominan 
military service wa~; slow in coming.15 As 
the Bl:itish colonial government tried to c:r:eate a lOCd_ 
armed militia fOL he purpog~s uf in nal security- rl 
n 
1952, the British passed the National Servicp Ordindnce and 
., 
. Dick Wilson .67 . 
)f Lhe !:--[ilitClIY in 
. ) 
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" the concept of national conscription WdS introduced to 
Singapore amidst strong protests and demonstrations from 
Chinese school students. " 16 This policy was discontinued 
after only a year and Patrick Mayerchak attributed this 
failure to the lack of enthusiasm among the Chinese 
community for military service.17 Chan Heng Chee also 
observed that the traditional attitude of the dominant 
Chinese population is best summed up by the adag-', "Good 
iron is never made into na i Is and good sons are neve}~ made 
into soldiers " .18 
Thus , when National Service conscription started in 
196 7 for independent Singapore, the government had to launch 
a concerted campa i gn to promote the idea of national defence 
and national defence consciousness among the people. By 
1971 , however , the then Defence Minister, Dr Goh Keng Swee 
was still lamenting that "a great deal remaing to be dune 
be for e the m 11 .i tar y pro ,f e D s .i 0 n can () c c: u p Y t. h (' h [) n our e d 
osition thdt it does in modern state::.:.".19 
SUbSf·quent ly the government attemotcu t.o raise t.he 
social status of the soldier in Singapore by induct.ing ~_;orne 
of the countr'~' best brains into the mIlitary thr0ugh the 
SAF scholar$hip scheme.20 Hence the concept of the Bc;holar 
16. Chan Heng Chee, op. e it. , p.140. 
17. Mayerchak, op. e i'~ '- . , !I.17:'. 
13. Chan Heng Chee, op. cit., p.142. 
19. Straits Times, .-, Jul 1971, r. 1 £. ,; 
o . Chan Heng Chee, OD. cit. . " 0.145-8. 
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officer. Both the Prime Minister's sons set the example b 
joining the SAF as scholar-officers. Other measures to 
attract and retain talent in the SAF and hence to raise the 
social status of the military, include the so-called 
"Wrangler" system21 and constant salary revisions so that 
the remuneration of the scholar-officers ln the SAF would 
keep pace with the private sector.22 
This need to foster a sense of defence consciousness, a 
vital quality for the effective functioning of a citizen-
army, is more acute for Singapore because its population is 
mainly of migrant stock. The so-called migrant mentality of 
self-centredness or the pursuit of self-interest is 
definitely not conducive to the creation of a sense of 
national commitment. Hence the government tried to impress 
upon the people of Singapore that it is in their enlightened 
self- int~'rest to see. that Singapore has the means tu p.r{)t.t.'c l.. 
its wealth and ensure d l) 0 r.n 'c c-- ("~ r"11- l' 1"'1 P (..>(1 p"'" <) C}' l)f' v ~ T" \. l: c- .. } ..J.,. ;.. '..-I \oJ'\ - .L.. t.c -, J.. .1. \.of.4 li 
credible defence capdbillty is seen as the ultimate 
guarantor of Singapore's wealth dnd d positive fdctor 11 
encouraging fo.reign investments in SingCtpore.2J 
21. T 1"1 e Wr a n 9 1 p r s ys t e m ~~ i n 9 1 e 5 0 u t db 0 u t 1 O~) 0 f the SA F 
regular officers for special responsibIlities dn~ pr0motlon 
if they med~ured up to the tdsks given. It give 
outstanding young officers the opportunity to devel.oD their 
full potential al earlier stages of thE:'ir careers. 
22. Chan Heng Chee, Ope cit., pp.147-8. 
23. Dr Wong Lin Ken, the then MP for Alex;.~nd"ra, remarked 
that without the armed forces "foreisn investors would write 
off Singapore as an atLractiv~ economi 
".,. Jan 1970 .. p.1. 
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A less publicised but more sensitive problem is the 
issue of Malays in the SAF. As Mayerchak puts it 
In the late 1960s Singapore's military 
establishment was heavily dependent on 
the Malay minority and when national 
service was introduced in 1967, man 
Chinese families sought exemption for 
their sons. Because of the racial 
problems between Malays and Chinese in 
neighboring Malaysia, from which 
Singapore had been ejected, Singapore 
could not accept a Malay dominated 
militaryestablishment.24 
This issue of Malays in the SAF carne to the fore in 
1987 following BG Lee Hsien Loong ' s off-the-cuff remark that 
Malay soldiers were not allocated certain sensitive 
positions in the SAF. This issue was again raised in 
Parliament on 14 March 1990 during which BG Lee Hsien Loong 
noted that there were now more Malay officers and section 
leaders in the SAF n 19 l he.r: e w f~ r u 87 lyra 1 d Y r . ... , l 0 nd ... 
servicemen undergoing section leaders training while the 
figure for 1988 was 169. Lik(;v/isp whi Ie in 1984 Lbel:e wert' 
onl 13 MaldYs undergoin c officer's t:rainin9, in 19 H B t r) 
fig u r e W d ~, 5 0 • Also, in June 1989, thE:." Sword of Honour for 
the best officer cadet was for the first timp awarded ~o I 
Malay nation(]l serviceman.25 BG Lee. Hsien Loong thpn 
cautioned that integration in the SAF must follow ana not 
lead integraLion in socict}. "Therefore 14e 
24. Mayerchak, op. cit., p.176. Also see Stanley S. 
Bed:in<jton's "Ethnicity and the ArnH~d Force,:.; jn Singapo.t'" 
i n De wit t c. E 11 i n woo d 6( C yn L hid H . En 1 0 e ( t;:' <1,,~, • ), E t h n 1 c i.1.Y 
New Jersey: Trdn~dction. Co. 1981 
Mar 1990 ) . 18 . 
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cautiouslY ... as Singapore society becomes more integrated 
the SAF '..,ill bring Malays into more areas of service. "26 
The preceding remark is interesting in revealing the 
thlnking of the Singapore government regarding the role of 
the SAF as a vehicle for nation-building. BG Lee's 
statement seems to indicate that instead of the SAF being 
the harbinger of the development of a new "national 
ide n t 1. t Y " 2 '1 , e t h n i c i n t e g rat ion i nth e S AF i sac t u all v he 1 d 
conditional to the level of ethnic integration in Singapore 
society. 
constraints o f Small Geographical Si ze 
Like all small states, Singapore also has to cope with 
the limitations arising from naturdl deficiencies in 
territorial size , population scale and resuurces. 
Slngdl>Ore'S reSTJonseS to the thrPdt uf ~..:urDr.i<5e aLt.~c:k qlV~_. 
its tin er.rlloridl SlL.e clte 1: 
on lectrorlic " orce str~cturc28 emph. . 515 econr .I. .,'" t~ 1-;. 
t' .. .11: ..L 19 L.YS 'lllb, dn" a rJ i G l'tl () l; . • L 
reserves 
26. 15 ~1u r 99C, L: .. r· 
.._ .18. 
28. 
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In the words of BG Lee Hsien Loong 
The armed forces of a small nation may 
be confined to a small area even before 
the war has started, but that does not 
mean they are defeated even before the 
war has started. Nor does it mean that 
the battle will be confined within the 
borders of the defender. Such 
artificial limits make no sense in dll-
out war. 
Singapore's military occupation by the Japanese during the 
Second World War reveals the non-viability of the strategy 
of static defence for Singapore. In fact, Dr Goh Keng Swee 
in a speech to Parliament in 1968 opined that "the sensible 
thing to do, if there is today a repetition of an offensive 
of this nature ag~inst Malaysia and Singapore, is to send 
our troops to fight on the beaches of Kota Bharu and by the 
Slim River alongside Malaysian forces rather than wait for 
the invading arrny to reach the CauL1eway. n29 ence SAF's 
ooerational strategy in war is base~ on the rapiJ dep:oymen~ 
of its forces outside Singanore in the evenL of C'onflll' 
i.e. "Forward Defencp!.30 According to some Halay ~ .ian 
()b~ervers, "the SAF's ODerdtional strategy for preem~Jtin(J 
the threat from the north continues to be gl)ided by tht 
p r inc i p 1 e 0 f f () r W d r d d e £ e nee I \1/ hie h e 111 lJ () dip ... ) the tl 0 ( 
"preventive attack' ."'31 
29. Straits Times, 4 Dec 1968, p.9. 
30. See also Chin Kin Wah' s analys is of the two "unstated 
features" of Singapore's defence strdtegy, i.e., strdtpL.'l:c 
mobility dnd forward defence. Chin Kin Wah (ed), D ________ _ 
Spending in Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS, 1987 
3 . 
31. Shuhud Saaid, "The Singapore Armed Force~.;: Pdrt One 
Girding up for 'Total Attack' through 'Tot.)1 Defence'" 1 11 
~de ASj2 w Defence Journal" Feb 1987 
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Singapore's acquisition of four very expensive E-2C or 
Hawkeye AEW airplanes at a cost of S$l billion (US$550 
million) underlines its concern with the danger of sneak 
attacks on Singapore and hence the need for an effective 
early warning system. Goh Chok Tong had this to say 
regarding the acquisition of the E-2Cs: 
.. in November 1979 ... a Vietnamese-
hijacked airplane flew into our 
airspace, escaping our radar until it 
was quite close to Singapore. What if 
it were a hostile plane? What would 
have happened if, in a. hostile 
situation, a hostile aircraft can come 
this close before it was detected? ... if 
you are caught with your pants down, you 
lose the whole citv. lI 32 
The other strateqy which smdll statet.: can use to 
c.: 0 m Den S d t e for the ina b i 1 i t y to" t r a des pac e for Lim e" 1 ~, 
Lhdt of rdpid mobilisation of rpserves. S I" 11 a a 1" ) r') h)'" • ..) .... )( t-~ ~l( ..I..e.;:;) 
f-~ 9 u 1 d r mob i 1 h.:; d t ion e x e r <..: i s e .3 t () t e ~ .. t the p, f f (' r t i v E' n ( 
its recall system. Thel' are two tVDe;:;, of mobiljsation 
namely, open and silent. Open mobjllsdlion relies upon tne 
mass medici to srJread the mohilisation messaqe Wheredf:> silellt 
mobilisation .relies on lelephone~; and radio-pdgers tu cell"' 
uo the re.:;erves. The dim is to t the recalled . .Jerv 1st:::, 
report to their unIts ithin sIx hours of th(! dctlvdLion 0 
the mobilisdtion order.33 
''''') ·"t ;t T" 17 M 1084 1° 
.:> .... OJ ra ... S Imes, dr ...... . .1 ,p. fJ. 
~3. Straits Times, 8 Apr 1989. 
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The paucity of training grounds for its armed forces 
arising fzom the geographical size of Singapor means that 
major training exercises have to be conducted oversedS. 
Singapore trains its troops regularly in Taiwan. Australia 
Brunei and from 1989, in Indonesia. Singapore maintains a 
training detachment of about 500 troops and 5 UH-1 
helicopters in Brunei. Overseas training facilities, 
however, are subject to the vagaries of political 
developments and are extremely expensive to maintaIn. For 
example, Singapore's training facilities in Taiwan may 
become a contentious issue for the Chinese government when 
talks for the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
China were to begin. Singapore's recent agreement with 
Indonesia which allow!:'. Lht' SAF to train on Indortf'.31dCl ::;I(.J'") 
per hap f) ref 1 e c t sag e n era 1 c () nee r Il ~ L n 0 ~; ~ i b :!. e C h 1 n (~ fj C 
objection to the presence of Singdp()re's tr~i' 
in Taiwan. 
f . 1 . 4- • a ell l... 1 t.- C> 
constraints of Small Population 
Wit hap 0 D U :;. uti 0 n 0 f abo u t 2. 6 mil -;. ion De 0 D 1 c... the r r\ • 
a definite constraint on the level of rnobilisdble strenqt} 
of the SAF. This small pOT)ulation b(Jse is ·.;ompounueQ by 
progressively declininq birth z"ates. As r; h inK 1 n W cl h 1 kt ~~. 
noted, "the 1985 intdke of natiunal servicemen comnr.ised 
rna i n 1 y t h <) S e lJ 0 r n in 19 6 7, aye a r w hie h saw 50 I 56 0 b i r t 11;:.. " 
Bdsed on the present fertility rate, Singapore would only 
have 37 1 000 births in the yedr 2000 and 29 / 300 by the year 
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2030."34 Coupled with an aging population, the SAF fi=1ces 
serious manpower constraints in the corning decades.35 See 
Table 4 below for a breakdown of the relevant population 
statistics. 
Table 4: Singapore: Population Projections 
Year 1985 2000 2020 2030 
IPopulati on 2,558,000 2 , 900 , 000 3 , 014,000 2,912,000 
I 
I 
INumber of Births 42,484 37,000 31,800 29,300 
I 
I 
IAged 0-14 Years 624,000 595 , 000 468 , 000 438,000 
I 
I 
IAged 15-59 Years 1 ,7 35 , 000 1/992,000 1 , 844,000 1,644,000 
I 
IAged 60 and Above 199,000 313,000 702,000 830,000 
SOUIce: Addoted from Chin Kin Wah, Ope cit., 0.218. 
The government hds responded at two levels. At the general 
societal level ·t has encouraged Singaporeans to produce 
more children, reversing the erstwhile restrictive 
population [Jolicy.36 t the level of the SAF, the reGPonge~ 
have been to D:r'ivatise wherever possible, maintendllce dnd 
other support activities. This is to ensure that the 
progressively declining supply of national servicemen i~ 
34. Chin Kin Wah, Ope cit., p.218. 
35. Mayerchak, Ope cit., p.178. 
36. Immigration , especidlly from Hong Kong, has (llso been 
encouraged in an attempt to make up for the projected 
population shortfall. 
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better utilised for vital combat and operational 
functions.37 
However, privatising maintenance work and 
commercialising support activities are not sufficient to 
cope with the declining nati.onal servicemen manpower. BG 
Lee Hsien Loong, in an interview published in the February 
1990 issue of the Armed Forces Journal International 
revealed that the SAF "may have to restructure combat units 
to make them smaller but more flexible, supplied with 
weapons and equipment to produce the same :Eirepower using 
less manpower."38 An example of utilising more manpower 
efficient weapons systems would be the locally-developed 
1SS-mm FH-88 howitzer which uses eight people compared to 
the 16 for the older ISS-mm howitzers. However there is a 
lim itt 0 t his pro c e S S 0 f sub s tit 11 t j n g ro de 11 i n e () l' f i yep C) W t' r 
for manpower ecause ultimatf'LY mdnpowf~ for: m ~.> the b ... 1 c k t) 0 n f> 
of dny pf£t-'cLive fighting force. Clearly therefore there 
is a very rU<..11 conslrdint UIi the: growth of the SAF (;"Ven it: 
material and financial resources permit. T~H! rna r~po\'lt~ r 
constr"dint \vill be a major factor stunting the expansion 0 .... 
the SAP in th~ coming decadew. 
25 aan 1989, p.16. 
38. BG Lee Hsit.'n Loong, Armed Forces J()~lrna:: 
T J. ~ " 
.J.nl.-ernal.-lona. ... February 1990. ~.52 . 
hapter Three: P46 
Allocation of Re s our c e s f or Defence 
The allocation of national resources for defence in 
Singapore is devoid of the intense inter-ser.vices dnd 
bureaucratic tussles that are prevalent in countries with 
strong traditions of inter-services rivalries or countrie 
where the military exerts predominant influence or in some 
cases even control over the civil political structure and 
processes . In Singapore , the control of the military by the 
civilian authority is undisputed and unchallenged. Togethe~ 
with the absence of any strong military traditions among the 
populace, the role of the military has been confined to that 
of its professional arena. Moreover, the cjvilian 
government has all along seen it fit to constantly dllocate 
substantia"' "' ., eve.1. of nationa"' resourc.-;;w for the milital. 
The current level d: located stands clt about 6~r~ of t he GNP 
which in dollar terms is S$ 3.463 b~11i0n or US$ 1 n 
b · , , . ....0 l.i .. lon . ..)7 oreover, as observed by Chan Hel11J Chc.:e 
"contacts between top ranking military leaders I~ fH1 l ·vil.iar 
po 1 i tic all e a de r s w i 11 t 3 k e p 1 dee 0 n b u <.l get cl 11 0 c: a t ion S d fH..1 
discussiun of strategic matters, but the distlrlct,ion between 
'nolitical' (',~nd 'militar ea~) of H 
maintained."40 
With a Lhriving ecorlomy ba!:..:ed primdrily on L t.id!::. .. 
serv:ces and a GNP of more thdll US$ 20 b.illion and the thl.r( 
39. The defence budget for 19'10 
stTaits Times , 15 Mdr 1990, D.18. 
O. Chan Heng Chee, op. cit.,- .v" 
~~esentpd to Parl~ament, 
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highest per capita income in Asia (after Japan and Brunei), 
Singapore is more fortunate than most other similarly small 
states when it comes to allocating national resources for 
defence. However the small population base also means that 
in per capita terms , Singapore, like all small states, will 
have to bear a disproportionate financial burden for 
defence. This is reflected by the fact that Singapore ranks 
highest in terms of per capita defence spending j,n the whole 
Asia-Pacific region: 
Table 5: 1987 Per Capita Defence Expenditure in US$ 
ISingapore 
I 
• 463 South Korea . . 134 
I 
IAustralia : 316 Malaysia: 51 
I 
I 
ITaiwan : 245 Thailand: 32 
I 
I 
INew Zealand 
I 
241 Philippines 13 
IJdpan 207 InuJ.C: 12 
j~------------------------------------------------------------------------~ I 
INorth Korea : 195 Indonesia: <3 
I 
Source: extracted from the 1989 Annual Reference Edition of 
the Pacific Defence Reporter. There are no precise 
stdtistics un BLunei'~ defence spenrling; but tho (}il rich 
micro-state (population: 345,048 in 1939) hds spent.. 
substdntial sums of money on procurf-~ ment of miliLdry 
hardwares since attaining its independence from Britain in 
1984. Funds totalling US$1.275 billion are repor'lctlly being 
made available (See Militdry Technology Jan 1990, Vol XIV 
Issue 1). 
Per cap ita de £ e nee t; pen din g h () we ve r 1. ::) no l () n ace U Y ate 
indicator of the militdrv strength of a country becdl15e a 
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country with a huge population like India can have a very 
low per capita figure on defence spending and yet it 
possesses a formidable military establishment. What per 
capita figure in defence expenditure does indicate however, 
is the disproportionate financial burden on defence borne by 
states with small populations. As Goh Chok Tong puts it, 
" Defence weapons cost the same to a poor country as to a 
rich country. There is no discount just because you are 
poor."41 
The challenge for the SAF therefore is to make sure 
that every dollar allocated for defence is well-spent and 
justified. Hence the SAF's policy of buying major new 
equipment and weapons systems only when it is absolutely 
necessary , preferring to retrofit and upgrade existing 
inventory. One very good example is the retrofitting and 
'lDgrad:n9 of the RSAF's A4 Skyhawks. Acc:ording BG Lee Hsif;n 
Loong, the Ministry of Defence had two options with th~ 
Skyhawks: either to phase them out or modernise the Skyhawk5 
and use them for another 15 years.42 Moreover, buying a 
whole new fleet of aircraft overnight would be "not only 
exorbitantly expensive, but also politicdlly insensitlve and 
unwis(~."43 What emerged is a new version of the A4, dubbed 
the ' Super Skyhawks' for their greater performance CJpd .,'- +-" . - ..... .x 
1. By "poor", Goh Chok Tong was refering to the reldtive 
paucity of national resources available to smaller states. 
Straits Times, 17 Mar 1934, p.18. 
42. Straits Times, 2 Mar 1989, p.l. 
J. SLruits Times, 2 Mar 1989, p.l. 
and new advanced functions and features. 
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The Super Skyhawk 
uses the advanced F-404 engine (similar to that used by the 
far more sophisticated F/A-18 Hornet), giving it 30% more 
power than the old J65 engine. New avionics also give them 
more flexibility in terms of functions and delivery of 
firepower. In sum, the successful retrofitting programme 
has given the A-4s another lease of life of about 15 years. 
Moreover there are economic spin-offs from the retrofitting 
programme in that since the A4 Skyhawks are the mainstay of 
the region's many air forces, the success of the Singapore's 
programme may mean more income earnings for the Singapore 
aircraft industry. 
This brings us to the so-called "Fourth Service" of the 
SAF, namely, the local defence industries. As a small stale 
Singapore can never hope to be self-sufficient in the whole 
spectrum of weapons and defence equipment production. Hence 
Singapor{~~ ~;L.rives for Eielf-511ffir"iency on1 in a few bas i, 
areas like small orcindnce, small arms, and in the drea 01: 
retrofitting imported weapon~ systems and equipment tC) meet 
the specific needs of the SAF. Of late the defence 
industries hdve moved into marine construction (like th~ 
missile corvettes) and productiol1 of larger weapon platforms 
like the FH-OB lS5rnm howitzers. However, the locul de£encp 
industries cannot hope to survive or be cost-effective iL 
they only serve the rleeds of the SAF because the latter j.s 
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relatively speaking only a small market. As BG Lee Hsien 
Loong puts it, 
Conc lusion 
While our defence industries were 
created to provide a degree of in-house 
capability to support our armed forces 
their guiding operational principle is 
commercial viability. The SAF is too 
small to absorb the capacity of our 
defense industries. In the early years 
it absorbed 70% of the industries' 
output. Even with the growth of the 
SAF , this has dropped to 40%, and will 
probably fall even further. The 
industries must therefore, look beyond 
the SAF to internationdl mdrkets Eor 
business.44 
In all fairness, it may be argued lhat SlngdpoLctS 
successful build-up of a credible defence cdpability does 
not represent the ~norm' in small stdtes' quest for 
security. Perhaps Singapore's 'success' in this regard is 
largely because it has been left in peace since independence 
to fashion its own political, economic dnd military sinew~. 
Singapore's sovereignty dnd terr' itorial-integritv havE: not. 
been seriously challenged by other larger powers. The 
plight of Cambodia today represents the unfortunate exampl~ 
of a small state whose security had been successfully 
challenged by a larger neighbour. Even if Cambodid in 1978 
had had the military equipment and armed forces of the 
current I eve 1 0 f Sin gap 0 r e , it won 1 d s t 1. 11 have been sub c.1lH~ (~ 
by Vietnam. Hence, hav ing the rui 1 i tary where'w 1 tha1 £01: .-;> 
44. Armed Forces Journal InLernatior. .1, Februnry 90 . r:') , II.::> L. • 
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small state is not the only solution or safeguard from 
political extinction. 
Singapore's possession of a credible military 
capability therefore is no guarantee of its continued peace 
and security. Measured against the milItary resources of 
its neighbours, Singapore certainly has a formidable 
military machine for its size. And the latter is an 
important point. No matter how efficient and resourceful 
Singapore may be in the area of military defence, it cannot 
escape from the realities of its geographical and 
demographic size. Singapore can never hope to outlast the 
military staying power of countries much bigger than itself. 
M 0 reo ve r, Sin gap 0 r e 's g eo gr.:" V L j c." ::.. .) n d de m 0 g rap hie 
com pa c t n e S S d n d i. t 5 h i g h de 1:> end e nee 0 n ext e .r n a 1 t r d de d n d 
investments make it pdrticularlv vulnerable to 1o\.,-lpvel or 
low intensity military hdrrassments. A repeat of the type 
of low-level military harrassments d L~ konfronta;-:;i, '\a(onld 
have serious repercussions for the Singaporean economy. 
Disruptions of the sed lines of communications (SLOes) 
around Singapore's waters through mining, piratical 
harrassrnents 0.1: blockade, would threaten the lifelines of 
the Singapore economy as well. 
Singapore therefore needs a complimentdry foreign 
policy that seeks to maximise the stakes whi~h ()ther powers 
Ii' 
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would have on the continued well-being of Singapore and also 
other measures to enhance its deterrent posture. In short, 
Singapore needs to possess as much derivative strength as 
possible. 
CHAPTER FOUR DERIVATIVE STRENGTH 
It ' s an axiomatic point that as a small state, 
Singapore ' s independent self-defence capability can never be 
sufficient when faced with external threats from powers 
bigger than it. In fdct Lee Kuan Yew stated that: "The 
biggest threat to Singapore is that any threat will come 
from someone bigger than us".l Hence the imperative to 
acquire as much derivative strength as possible to 
supplement its intrinsic military capability. As Michael 
Handel puts it , 
Weak states must learn to "draw on" or 
" borrow " the strength of other states. 
They will try to manipulate and commit 
if they can, the strength of other 
states (mostly great powers) , in order 
to secure their own interests. There 
are two major ways in which the weak 
states can recruit the support of other 
countries. They may either enter into d 
formal alliance with other states, or 
they may reach an informal, though not 
necessarily less helpful, understanding 
with partners sharinq common inle.rests.2 
In this regard, the emphasis of S.ingdpore '5 strC(t.egy 
has been on the informal approach. Even within the morp 
f.ormal mechanisms like the Association of South-East Asian. 
NaLJoIi.5 (ASEAN) and the Five-Power Defence Arrangemtjnts 
(FPDA), the guiding motif has been the element of 
53 
1. Quoted by Leszek Buszynski, "Singapo.re: A Foreign Policy 
of Survival " in Asian Thought & Society, New York: East -
West Publishing Company, Jul 1985 Vol. 10 No. 29, p.133. 
2. Michael Handel, op. cit., p.120 (emphasis o:r:iginal). 
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informality. Singapore has good reasons for such a 
strategy. Besides the fear that any formal pact, especiall 
one of a military nature, might arouse tensions both within 
and outside the pact, a formal alliance would mean a 
diminution of Singapore's independence because as a sma11 
state, its say within any formal alliance is bound to be 
less than equal to that of the bigger powers who can commit 
greater resources. As S. Rajaratnam stated in his first 
major foreign policy speech to Parliament on 16 and 17 
December 1965, It ••• when a small country like Singapore 
aligns itself with a big power, there is no doubt as to who 
keeps in step with whose policies".3 
Singapore's general approach has been to enconrage 
(; 0111 pet i n y d. n d c (> u n t e r va iIi n g ext r cl - t e 9 i. (I fl d 1 i n l t ~ r €~ t> L s ~ n L h c 
continued well-being of Singdpore and regiondl ::-;tdbll:t.1' 
Encourag.ing such con s t e 11 (';1 t i on 0 £ i n t e res t [i a n c.1 i n f llH 'It C f> ~ 
wuuld give Singapore more room to mano~uvre. It ~c ~¥.,~ ~.J (i "'-..r...'JlL;::'· 
of the game of balance of power thdt when b.ig powers cOnlk'ete 
for influence and powerl small states can have greater 
barga ining power vis-a-vis these great pO\Olers. 4 AL the 
regional level, Singapore seeks to 'twin' its destiny with 
those of its closest neighbours, namely Malaysia dnd 
3. See s. Rajaratnam: The ProphetIc 
collection of selected speeches and 
Raj~ratnam as compi led dnd edi ted by Ch .. ln Heng Chee 
Obaid ul Hag, Singapore: Graham Brash, 1987, p.284. 
See Michael Handel, op. cit., pp.175-187 fur dn 
of the po~,ition of smull states In the context of d 
of-power system. 
a 
ana 
=:t '1 :1 1 v~' 1'· t ... ' .A.. J. ~ a...J 
balancE' 
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Indonesia. Through a process of identifying some of 
Singapore's national interests with its neighbours' dnd the 
creation of a web of interdependent economic relationships, 
broad areas of common interests may be derived. These areas 
of common interests not only serve as a basis for confidence 
building in bilateral relationships but also for mutually 
beneficial economic relations.5 
In terms of formal membership, Singapore is a member += o~
the FPDA, ASEAN, the United Nations, the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and the British Commonwealth. With close 
relevance to Singapore's immediate security concerns are the 
FPDA and ASEAN, which shall be the focus of the following 
1 . ana.ysls. 
The FP D A wa 5 co rt C c~ i v e (1 i n 19 7 1 d S d 1. e pIa c em e n t L 1I L h ~ 
defunct Anglo-Malayan Defence Arrangement of 1957.6 The 
FPDA groups together Malaysia, Singapore, GLcat Britain, 
Australia, and New Zealand in a loose defence comosct which 
provides for mutual consultation in the event of a threat tl) 
,-he security of either Malaysia or Singapore without 
however, dny E:'xpl i cit corom i tment to the i r de fence. Wh" •• 
formed in 1971, it was mednt to fjll the void left behinl1 hoi 
the <1 epa r t u reo f B r i tis h f o:r: c e 5 fr:o m t h p .r e g :. (J Il <.if 1 d : \, 
5. See char!.. .i.. two above for an dnaly~-) is of the 'l.r Lingle 
of growth 9 concept between Singapore, Johor (Maldysia) dnd 
Batam (Indonesia). 
6. See Chin Kin Wah, The Defer\....~· of Mdldysia and 31nqdo.:re: 
The Transformation of ~ SccurlLy System 1957-71, C~mbri~ge 
University Press, 1983, chapter 9. 
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brought Malaysia and Singapore time to build up credible 
defence capabilities.7 The FPDA is not a formal military 
alliance with a command structure for war-time contingency 
like NATO or the WARSAW Pact. It also does not have a full-
time command structure in peacetime; its modus operandi 
being a series of annual meetings and joint military 
exercises among the various partners.8 The absence of a 
command structure allo~s Malaysia and Singapore to continue 
to claim their non-aligned status and moreover , it would not 
be in the interest of the extra-regional powers to agree to 
an open-ended commitment to the defence of Singapore and 
Malaysia. Such a minimal commitment by the extra-regional 
powers to the security of Singapore and Malaysia huwever, IS 
viewed in the wider context of being d function of the 
overall u.S. policy and interests in Southeast Asia and as 
Lee Kuan Yew said in 1978 " Whether it (FPDA) will continue 
to have any relevance depends not simply on Australia and 
New Zealand, but on the US , her policies and posture in the 
Pac i f i can dIn did n 0 C P <:Hl" • 9 
The c.;ontinuing relevdnc(-~ of thp. FPDA to Singaoor .. ') a; .. ,') 
regional security is besl summed u by B iqadjer-Gt:.'l'l'-' 031 
(Reservist) Lee Hsien Loong: 
7. BG Lee Hsien Loong, Armed Force:: Journal InternaLlorlal 
".l.. "0 Ope Clt.., p.:) . 
8. straits Times 12 Der 198Q, p.18. 
9 . Quoted by Oba id III H, 1 , "Fc)'r e i gn 
Quah, Chan Heng Chee & SI,', Chce 1"1eow (eds.), Gov~ ....... ~ •. ~ 
and Politic.;s of Singapore, Singapore: Oxford Unive 
p.287. 
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It is a political and psychological 
deterrent to any potential aggressor, 
who will not only have to consider the 
combined strength of the armed forces of 
Singapore and Malaysia, but also the 
possible involvement of Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom and 
through them, their friends and allies. 
This "imponderable" is at the core of 
the FPDA's deterrence.IO 
The FPDA however is more than a political arrangement. 
Under its auspices, the Integrated Air Defence System (lADS) 
has been formed which provides for the combined defence of 
the Malaysia-Singapore air space. The lADS comes closest to 
an institutionalisation of the concept of the 
~indivisibility' of defence between the two states.ll The 
involvement of the extra-regional powers also provides d 
non-sensitive format for the armed forces of Singapore and 
Malaysia to work together. Such a functional defence 
relationship between Singapore and Malaysia contributes in 
an important manner to the building of cunfiJen~e 1:1 
bilateral and c1e.£ence relations bE:>t,\4een the tw f! i gh bou., <.J • 
Hence Singapore has souqht to derive additional strelll.}th in 
terms of the deterrent value of the FPDA as well at; In 
combining defence resources with Malaysia under thp lADS. 
However. as the smalles 'power' within FP;::)A .. SingdDo 
sees the need to earn its rightful placp as dn eOGdl partner 
in the a:r:rangement. As the FPDA mcaIl~> ma t s· .\ () r f~ , ~;. 
10. Armed Forces Jo~rnal International op. cit. '.) r·o .• ~ . 
11. See chapter t~u above. 
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security interests than to the extra-regional powers, 
Singapore is doing more than any other partners to try to 
keep the FPDA in existence. Singapore therefore 
participates actively in the FPDA by committing two F-5 
squadrons to the IADS. In a period of receding tensions in 
superpower relations and tight fiscal priorities in 
Australia, New Zealand and Britain, Singapore fears an 
abandonment of the FPDA by these extra-regional powers. 
Singapore seeks to continually engage the security interests 
of these extra-regional powers by constantly 'reminding' 
them of the continued relevance of the FPDA to regional 
security. Singapore also tries to pre-empt the possibility 
of these extra-regional powers abandoning the FPDA as a 
result of a perception by the electorates of the extra-
regional powers that the FPDA is a drain on their respective 
national defence resources and thus skewing their respective 
defence priorities. singanore does not wi~:>h to creaLe .)11 
image of a smdll state <.Jetting a 'free ride' lhrough Lhf> 
FPDA, knowing full well that f;uch a perception can lec:Hl to 
an early dpmise of the arrdngement especially in a probdblc 
scenario of the extra-regional powers no longer pp.rc~lving 
he FPDA as essentidl to their own security concerns. 
However, if the extra-regional powers see thdt their 
involvement i.n the FPDA does nol distort their own nation(~1'" 
etence priorities, the probalJilitv of their COlltinued 
~.;unport for the FPDA would Df! grpuLer. For. eXdmpl 
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Australia only needs to maintain a rolling ~eployment of one 
or two of its warships in the region and the presence of an 
F-18 squadron based in Tindal, Northern Australia. Such a 
deployment of its defence assets goes a long way to underpin 
Australia's diplomatic posture and interests in an area 
coterminous to its security boundaries as spelt out by the 
1987 White Paper on Defence. 
ASEAN was founded in August 1967 to promote regional 
cooperation among the states of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thaj,land and Singapore.12 ASEAN was founded 
against the backdrop of a post-Soekarno era in Indonesian 
and Southeast Asian politics. ASEAN~ as Leszek Buszynski 
points out, "symbolizes the Indonesian commitment to a 
regional stability which is intended to foster t :l" 
conditions favourable for economic development of the 
reQion".13 As an exollcit Indonesian commitmenl to rf'qi()na~ 
b · '" . l s ta 1.L 1 . Y, ASEAN w~s welcomed by Singapore; but there also 
existed in Singupore lJr{!l'len.Jluns Lhat ASEAN "might ::-if'rVp 
a san a 1 t ern at i v t? ve h i c 1 e for I n don e s L.Ul •. un bit i () n t! • 1 4 A. :~. 
the smallest found81: member of ASEAN 1 S.ing~.H)01:e ds~)iduoLlsl 
tr i es to dVU iei the deve lopment 0 f an ASEA.N tha t 1 ~:a Vf'~. t.he 
managempnt of regional orJe. nd 5e~urity bolely i L rH 
hands of regional powers. Such a form of exclu::~iv~ 
12. Brunei joined A:JEAN on 7 JanUdl:.Y ::"984, a week after 
being granted its independence from Great. Britalli.. 
k Bus~ynski, Ope cit., p.133. 
14. Hichael Leifer, "The Conduct of Foreiqn Policy" in San(11 
& Whedtley (eds.), Ope cIt., p.970. 
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regionalism will leave Singapore with very few alternatives 
in the pursuit of its foreign and security policies. 
Initially, Singapore perceived ASEAN as simply an 
expression of a corporate idealism - a desire for the ideals 
of regionalism. Singapore was cognisant of the practical 
difficulties in achieving Southeast Asian regionalism. As 
S. Rajaratnam opined in ~970 
The fact is that the theory of 
regionalism finds itself caught in a 
[ ... ] contradiction the effort to 
reconcile the theory of regionalism wittl 
the practice of nationalism .... When it 
comes to translating the objects 
contained in the Declaration into 
action, it is not regional interests but 
national interests which become the 
primary consideration. This hdS been so 
in the case of ASEAN. Regionalism, by 
and 1 a r q p 1 rem a ins a c.: 0 n v e n i f~ n t d 8 vic (~ 
for proIDvt.ing nation.:ll intere~,ts - fo.r 
resolving national problems.15 
~ingap0re's perception of thp utili~ ).E ASEAN dnl' 
rey-ionalism begdn to change ill the mid-lg70s. The n i 1 
c r .i :3 i s i rn pre 5 ~; e d Up 0 n Sin gap 0 ret h €.: V,J 1 n e .r 1 ., • l • 1. .1, l 
high dependence on inlerndtional trade drHl comIller 
o L-... 1...:" 
l1U t ht. 
need to partiall overcome this handicap lh.cou<jh a reCuU!Sr 
to regional resources and cooperation. The Aml'~r i c, 
strategic retredt from Indochind also threw open the 
r e q ion a 1 are nat U 0 the r 1 a r 9 e d nun 0 t sol a r q (~ DO \-1 e t' ~.i 1 i. k e 
the USSR China, VletIldnl and Indid. RegionalIsm within 
15. Chan & Obaid, OPe cit., .297 . 
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ASEAN became a shelter at a time of international 
uncertainty. The improvement of bilateral relations with 
Malaysia and Indonesia following Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew's first official visits to Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta in 
March lQ7~ and May 1973 respectively also contributed to the 
shift in Singapore ' s perception of regionalism and ASEAN. 
In 1975 , S. Rajaratnam declared that the historical 
"significant moment " had arrived for ASEAN and he argued, 
If the performance of ASEAN has been 
disappointing so far, it is not because 
it has not achieved anything but because 
it has failed to fully and successfully 
exploit its real potentialities .... we 
have been driving a high-powered Rolls-
Royce at thirty miles an hour to carry 
weekly groceries [p.3211 .... There are 
limits to what nationdl solutiu!l:] can do 
to OVErcome our mounting economic 
difficulties. We are compelled by thE.' 
economic .redlit:ies of loddy to find 
solutions at three levels natioI?,-"' 
regional and inlernational. For the 
r P. m p. (11. e s to be effective there must be 
harmonis~tion of ~;o1.ut.ions at. 0311 thesf> 
three levels [p.3231.16 
Hence a recourse to regionalism was deemed necessdry to 
overcome Singapore's vulnerable positIon in the. 
international system. Through ASEAN, Singaoore has bAen 
better placed to make its views heard un the world s("pne -
bot hat the Un i ted Nat i (J n s G en era 1 Ass e mb 1 y it ~ I d t h r (l u q h t rlf 
ASEAN post-ministeridl conference d~alotjuf\ 5es~,~OIA;J ¥lith t,he 
major Western Nations. An example of how SingdPore v/db db ':e 
to utilise the collective strength of ASEAN u.nity to £OIC~ 
16. Ibid. 
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bigger country to modify an economically harmful policy to 
Singapore was the case of Australia's 1979 International 
Civil Aviation Policy (ICAP).17 
The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 proved to be a 
watershed for the development of ASEAN. The communist 
victories in Indochina had a galvanising effect on the non-
communist governments of ASEAN. The first ASEAN Summit was 
held in Bali in 1976 and amongst other things, a Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation was signed. The 1976 Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation upheld the principle of national 
sovereignty18 in the conduct of relations between the 
signatories and as Michael Leifer puts it, "For Singapore, 
the smallest member of ASEAN, this collective commitment 
represented an important measure of assurance and encouraged 
a stronger commitment to ASEAN to the extent that it had 
17. Australia sought to monopolise the Europe-Australia air 
traffic by imposing a hedvy tdriff on passengers stopping 
over 1n Southed~t Asian c<:.tpi talb. SUerl d polic-y vJould hll~ ... 
Singapo:re most as the bulk of the 
Singapore. A collective ASEAN 0 
modifications of some of the mor 
TCAP. 
stopover traffic is in 
obilion led to the 
objectionable aspect::.. of 
1 8. A r lie 1 e 2 0 £ the T r E~ a t y s tat est h d t "I nth e i .r r p 1 d t i 0 r 1~) 
wi.th orle another I the high contractiny- parties ::7>hal: be 
9 u ide d by the £ 0 11 0 11/ i n g p r inc i p 1 e 5: ( a ) m u t U d 1 r t-; ~; t) (' c; t £ 0 r 
the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations; (b)the z' 
of every state to lead its nRtional existencp free from 
xternal inler£eIencp, subversion or coerc:i()n; (c)non 
~ 
\or 
i n t e r fer e nee i nth e i n t ern ,J 1. d £ f d irs 0 f 0 n e an 0 the r ; 
(d)seltlcment of differences or disputes llY pPdceful medns. 
Renunciation of the thredt. or use of forcf.>; ancJ (e)e£fective 
cooperation among themselves. 
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tied its (ASEAN's) cohesion and viability to a proclaimed 
public philosophy".19 
As a small state, Singapore perceives regionalism as a 
double-edged sword. Strong regionalism unaccompanied by a 
public commitment of the larger partners to the sanctity of 
national sovereignty might lead to a diminution of 
Singapore's independence; yet, regionalism if conducted on 
the basis of equality between the constituent members and 
respect for the sanctity of national sovereignty, is an 
important source of derivative strength. S · I 1_ Ingapore s 
perception of regionalism shifted from the former view in 
the early years of ASEAN to the latter view as a result of 
the developments in the early 1970s described above. 
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December lq78 
struck d hard blow at t most ~)ens L t i ve chor'd 0 f tilt 
security perception of a small stdte li.ke Singapore - the 
drmed i nva s 10n and occupa t i on 0 f a sma 11 .:) Ld tf-! by (;l Lu.r Sf. 
ne i, qhbour . ASEAN became a vehicle for Singapore to uroj{.>c;t 
i t ~ s t ron 9 e G t 0 b j e c t ion t 0 Vie t n a 111 's v.i old t 1 (Hi 0 f t h l: 
" d . 1 . . .' l ' .-: tl~ . t f-'" t I- "2 t) A 7\' 1"\ car 1 n a .... Dr 1 n c.: .1 D eo..... 1 e soc 1 e y 0 5, a \.. e s .' (J .:t Il' , 
Singapore has derived additional st:rength for it:::> dio]umatic 
Josition through a united 'ASEAN' diplomatic posture over 
Cambodia. Had there not been an ASEAN~ Vietnam would 
probably have been able to gel away with a military and 
'9. Sandhu & Wheatley (eds.) o p. cit. I p. 9 7 -.. . 
'"10 Tb'" '9 75 • .1. lQ., 'P. • 
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political fait accompli in Cambodia and Singapore would be 
left to assess the implications for its own security of the 
precedent set by Vietnam. The importance of ABEAN in this 
context to Singapore's security interests is obvious. 
Though ASEAN relies primarily on political means to 
achieve its security needs, there also exists extensive 
informal bilateral security links between member states. 
For example Singapore holds regular bilateral military 
exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The 
Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) also trains at the 
Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The other members of 
ASEAN also conduct regular bilateral military operations and 
exercises with e~ch other. 
ASEAN however has resisted any moves towards a regional 
formdlisdtion of these cxlensive b~ldterdl security linktJ 
for at least two reasons. F.i:r.stly, the creation of d~l ASEA~T 
military bloc would willy nilly lead to a militar 
olarisation of Souttleast Asia which is alreddy DulltlcJll 
polarised between the non-communist ASEAN dnd commanist 
Indochina. Such a development can only If'n(1 to dn inc .rCd .. :)( 
in the nrobability of a regional armed conflict. :)'y SeL:orHt..l,. r 
ASEAN members have di£.Eering strdtegic peL('l~pt~~H, ~, w':'Lb 
regard to the source of its ootential threat WhilE' 
Tndonesia and Malavsia perceive dn economicdlly dnd 
militarily resurgent China the q:!:eater threat to t.heir 
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securit\; Thailand (especially before the advent of the 
Chatichai government), sees China as a natural geo-strategic 
ally to counter the more immediate threat to its security 
boundaries arising from Vietnam's military consolidation in 
Indochina. Michael Leifer puts it thus, "ASEAN's corporate 
position barely concealed mixed interests, in particular 
over the indirect association with China in challenging 
Vietnam".21 
The extensive informal security links between the ASEAN 
states however have created a de facto regional security 
community. As the tben (June 1980 - Sep. 1988) Singapore's 
Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan said, "There is no policy o[ 
formal regional military cooperation among the ASEAN 
countries, but they are not unmindful that the informal web 
of bilateral collaboration and coooeration amung ttleir drmed 
forces vlould improve their odds in dealing \vith unfr iend!. 
powers. "'hrOU9h this networK, Singapore makes a mO(Jp,-.I... 
contribution to regional security".2'1 
Singapore has also depended on a t>l.al>le regi011d: 
\·'alance of powe 
.A m 0 n 9 the big po vI e r ::j t 0 un d l\ .c pin i t ~ 
security and economic devplooment. I nth i ~i reg 3. r (1 
Singapore makes n() honef:1 of the fact that it ~;ce!.J d westE.·r. 
2"' M" I ' T Of • .1.. de 1ap.i. uel. er i 
in Conflict studies 
Studies, May 1989, 
"Cambodian Conflict - The Find:!. pr.ar;e?" 
Ce n t reF 0 r Sec u r· i t.Y d n d Con f} i (' t 
22. S. Dhanabalan, "Slng()Porp in 
Action Party 30th Anniversary .,. -..I.;:"> 
Sou the d s t A .. -) i d " 
1984, D.11 ..... 
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military presence as more conducive to its security concerns 
than a predominant Soviet or Chinese presence, As S. 
Rajaratnam stated in an interview with Chan Heng Chee and 
Obaid ul Haq, 
Though we want all powers to 
in Asia, we are closer to and 
with the Americans than 
others .... Our connections are 
be present 
feel safer 
with the 
close with 
America, our economic relations are with 
America. They can provide much more for 
our economic well-being, whereas Russia 
can give us very little. Our cultural 
orientation is towards the West. and we 
make no pretence about it.23 
The United states military bases in the Philippines are 
viewed by Singapore as instrumental for regional security 
and stability. Singapore hence watches with great 
apprehension at the possible removal of these bases.24 That 
Singapore seriously values the U.s. military presence for 
"ts own security is reflected by Singapore's gesture, 
announced in AL1gu~.t 1989 t make dVdilable more o. i t~) 
military faci7.it:'es an(~ serviceg for u.S. forces in the 
region. S i ngapor e must know that i t Wd~\ .r i ~d< 1. nl 
censur n such a move dS 't runs counter to th_ Nd Id. 'It; j a~. ... 
mucn-cher ished ideal of a Zone of Peac(!. Fret:clom ane 
23, Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, ap. cit., p.493. 
24. See Desmond Ball (ed.), Us Bases in the Philippines: 
Issues and Implications, Cdnberra Papers on strategy and 
Defence No. 46, 1988. Especially chdpter by Le~zek 
Buszynskl, "ACEAN and the US Bases in the Philip~ines" 
an analysis of the role of the bases in the context 0 ... 
reaional security dnd stability. 
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Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia.25 Also, Indonesia 
cannot openly support such a stance by Singapore dS it also 
runs counter to Indonesia's aspirations for leadership of 
the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover it contradicts the 
Indonesian-inspired 1967 Bangkok Declaration that all 
foreign bases in Southeast Asia are only temporary in 
nature. 
The controversy aroused by Singapore's offer to host 
some U.S. military facilities reveals fundamental 
differences between Singapore and its larger neighbours, 
especially Indonesia and Malaysia with regard to 
regionalism. As described earlier, Singapore as a small 
state views regionalism as a double-edged sword. For the 
larger states, especially Indonesia as the largest regional 
state, the presence of the superpowers in the region poses, 
if not a threat, then at least a hindrance to its regional 
interests. These reg~onal interests may be expressed by a 
desire to be the prime manager of regional order and 
security. Hence Indonesia constantly puts forth the view 
that regionalism in its ideal form should exC'lude thp super 
and extra-regional Dowers. The presence of the U.s. 
military bases in the Phllippines is dC'cepted .so .i,onq dS 
they are not considered a permanent fixture of d regIonal 
25. In 1973, ASEAN adopted a re501ution accepting the 
rinciples of ZOPFAN. Singapore's position, ~luwcvcr l~ 
until such time as conditions for the setLing ~p of sue 
Z 0 J 1 ear e 0 b t a in ed, i tis beE. t t ha t the we s t ern pc 'W e r :-:. b .~ 
encouraged to stay in the region. 
Lhu'L 
u 
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security arrangement. No doubt Indonesia does see the 
stabilising impact of the U.S. military presence but only so 
long as the Soviet Union remains a relevant military facto 
in the region. Hence accepting the U.s. presence in the 
region is simply a matter of strategic expedience rather 
than a preferred policy choice. Indeed the Jakarta Post 
re f lected tha t given the fundamenta 1 changes in East --West 
relations, a "rare opportunity" has arr.·ived for Southeast 
Asia to work out a "new security setting with a much lower 
equilibrium of the superpowers' presence".26 But for 
Singapore at least, the U.s. presence is a development it 
conscientiously tries to promote. As BG Lee Hsien Loong 
stated in Parliament on 14 March 1990 it is in Singdpore's 
strategic interest to have the U.S. in the region " foI as 
long as possible".27 It should be noted however that 
Singapore's offer to host some u.s. military facilities is 
dlso seen by certain sections of the Indonesian and 
Malaysian security establishments dS a positive [dcto 1 
regional security becduse the u.s. militar presence i~j 
privately acknowledged a. Lk.!l..lIH':C to the Sovlet 
naval forces in the region. 
Singapore hence has to constclntly walk t.he tightropt.' ~ I.. 
deriving collective strengtll from being part of ASEAN 
regionalism and yet preventing the development 01 ~n 
exclusive regionalism which can be inimica1 to it~ nolltica~ 
26. Straits Times, 
27. straits Times 
9 Aug 1989. 
15 Ma :r' 19 9 0 p.18. 
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independence and even security. The price of obtainin 
derivative strength through ASEAN regionalism is less 
freedom to order its own national priorities. Malaysia dnd 
Indonesia have constantly charged that Singapore's actions 
like the Herzog visit and the offer to host some U.S. 
military facilities, are detrimental to ASEAN unity and as a 
Malaysian national daily the Berita Harian Malaysia argues, 
" "t .• 1 is true that the final say lies with Singapore, but 
in the context of ASEAN matters of the region should be 
discussed first so as to reach agreement among the ASEAN 
counLries".28 The crux of the issue is that "mat ters of the 
region" are viewed differently and at times even 
contrastingly, from the national perspectives of Singapore 
and its larger neighbours. And in so far as regionalism is 
simply a vehicle for attaining respective national 
priorities, such differences with regard to the 
interpretation and substance of regionalism are bound to 
arise from time to time. 
Also , exclusive regionalism is ctnathema to singapore's 
economic development and nLosnerity. Singapore does nut see 
an intra-ASEAN bloc ~s d viable tion; hence the lim] L{~d 
pr ogress in intra -ASEAN economi c cooper.) t 1 on. At S T 
Rajaratnam puls it, "the only relcvdnt economic wnlc:l 
can give us a reprive or save us, is the globdl economic 
system .... there cannot bp ::':dlvatlon bv ... fiv8 ASEAN 
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countries getting together and solving their economic 
problems within the walls of regional cooperation. The weak 
combining with the weak need not add up to strength. The 
weak can strengthen themselves only by plugging collectively 
into the global economic system."29 
At the international level, Singapore's ability to 
influence strategic developments is practically nil. What 
it can do as a small state is to encourage the rule of law 
and support for the United Nations. Singapore believes that 
"without the United Nations, the world would be an even more 
anarchic and dangerous place ... (it) ensures some measure of 
law and order, even when both are flouted by members from 
time to time". 30 As a smaJ.l state, Sinqapore hdS a ve[.tee 
"nte:rest in supportln(J the Int.ernationtll nurm::.:,; ·..;hic:h 
obLained after the Second World War - llorms like the r:ght 
of self determinationl rIghts of sovereign territorlu 
i n t f"! q r i t1' , the 9 row i n g e (H1 d 1 i t Y 0 f s tat e 5 i n i n t ern':'l t. i {)!l d 1 
organisations and the increasing disapproval of the use of 
naked force between states, estJecially by a big DOWel. nIl d 
small one. These "new norms" are indeed conducive £dctors 
n aidi.h.1 the survival of small states in the wOl:.ld todav.21 
29. Interview with Chan Hen9 Chee and Obdid -.11 HaqJ' op. 
cit., 1987, p.498. 
30. Ibid., p.515. 
..... 1 See M" ~1. ae' Hdr- u~ - '1 I r C"l'.L J • lell .... i 1 LJ.J' ,)p. l.. pp.265-277, A 
Conduct Among 
:Jcndix B: 
""'he ~New' International Norms c" 
the position of Wea}~ States". 
d 1'1<...1 
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CONCLUSION 
Singaporefs strategy for survival can thus be analysed 
from three levels, namely national, regional and 
international. At the national level lies the attainment 
of a credible military capability. That intrinsic strength 
has to be augmented by the derivative strength of 
regionalism and the involvement of extra-regional interests 
in Singapore's continued well-being and security. However, 
regionalism is viewed as a vehicle to attain national 
objectives, i.e., regionalism as an utilitarian concept; 
hence tensions inevitably exist between Singapore and its 
larger neighbours with regard to the involvement of extra-
regional interests in the management of regional security. 
At the international level, Singapore is dependent on 
international tr~Jc ~rld commerce for its economic survival. 
The encouragement of a free trade system and open markets in 
the West as well as support for international norms of the 
rule of law form the substance of Singaporets limited 
ability to influence world affairs and developments. 
Suc~e5s in the management of Singapore's security is 
measured by the absence of the need to invoke the 
destructive power of the SAF. The failure of Singapore's 
security planning would be obvious once the need to invok_ 
the SAF arises. As a tiny city-state, there can be no 
return to the status quo ante if Singapore were to be 
involved in an all-out military conflict with any potential 
~II 
aggressor. 
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~ence it is the writer's contention tha~ 
Singapore needs to rely heavily on non-military mechanisms 
of security as well. Building the conditions for stability 
and peace in the region through economic coopezation 
diplomacy and regionalism is just as important as preparing 
for the at best Pyrrhic victory in war. 
II' 
Appendix: Singapore's Militar y F orce St ructure 
According to the 1989 Annual Reference Edition of the 
Pacific Defence Reporter, some relevant aspects of 
Singapore's highly mobile force structure are as follows: 
ARMY 
I 
ILight Tanks 
1 
I 
IAPC 
I 
I 
1 
I 
ITowed Arty. (155mm) 
I 
1 
NAVY 
IMissile Craft 
I 
.Patrol Craft 
I 
I 
I 
I 
/Amphibious 
I 
I 
I 
350 AMX-13 
720 M-1l3 
30 V-lID 
250 V-150/-200 Comman~o 
38 Sol tam M-·7' 
16 M-114Al & n some FH-38" 
6 Sea Wolf (FRG Lurssen-45) 
6 Independence/Sovereignty 
1 Endeavour (trg) 
1 Panglima (trg) 
12 others (under 100 tons) 
5 Endurance LST (US LST-511) 
[capacity:16 tanks/200 troopsl 
8 mecharlized landing craft 
* Singapore is acquiring six West Germdn r.urssen-designed, 
GOO-ton, Type 62 missile corvettes. 
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I I 
AIR FORCE 
IGround-attack Fighters 
14 squadrons 
I 
I 
I 
1 * 8 F-16s delivered in early 
1 
IFighters 
12.3quadrons 
I 
63plus A-4S/S1 
13plus TA-4S/S1 
29 Hunter F-74 
4 T-75 
1990 
33 F-SE 
9 F-SF 
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I 
fAirborne Early Warning 
ITransport Aircraft 
12 squadrons 
I 
1 
I 
ITransport Helicopters 
13 squadrons 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
E,'- ';"'" , .L.\.... 
4 C-130B 
6 C-130H 
6 Skyvan 3m 
6 AS-350 
24 UH-1B 
16 UH-IH 
4 AB-205 
') An -. "'" -'-. 
...J ~ )..)Lli 
19 AS-332M 
i 
I 
I 
1,1: 
I/! 
, I 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A Note 
Relatively very little academic research has been done 
on the area of Singapore ' s defence and security_ The 
'sensitive nature' of the topic and the lack of public 
debate on the topic mean that the researcher has to rely 
heavily on government speeches and statements as a paramount 
source of information. As the defence-policy formation 
process is very much a governmental preserve, the government 
has been very frank and forthright in revealing its thinking 
in its public pronouncements. Such speeches and statements 
are always highlighted in the national English daily, the 
Straits Times; hence the need to rely heavily on the Straits 
Times in writing this paper. The small number of in-depth 
analyses by academics and observers are confined to the 
occasional journal article or a chapter of a book. 
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